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The use of space has grown exponentially. It is impossible today to
conceive of international communications, weather forecasting, or the
screening of the riches of the earth without the help of space-based de-
vices.' Full-scale industrialization of outer space is under way, and space
has become a critical arena for military strategists in the global duel.
Many of these uses can be performed successfully only by placing a
satellite at a very special location in outer space, the so-called geostation-
ary orbit. Only in this ring high above the earth's equator can space
objects be maintained in a fairly stable position relative to the earth. In
1963, the United States launched the first geostationary satellite,
Syncom-2. Since then, demand for positions in the orbit has grown rap-
idly. The rigid constraints of science and technology further stimulate
fierce competition.
With ever-growing use, saturation of the geostationary orbit has be-
come a matter of widespread concern. In particular, countries less ad-
vanced in space technology fear that these valuable orbital positions will
be fully occupied before they are capable of launching their own devices.
Inclusive arenas have come to deal with the issue, primarily the Intema-
* The starting point for these deliberations was an article written with my Tiibingen
colleague Riidiger Jung, to whom I am deeply indebted: Wiessner & Jung, Das
v'lkerrechtliche Regime der geostationdren Umlaufbahn, 32 6S'rERREICHSCHE ZErrCHRiFr
FOR OFFENTLICHEs REcHT UND VOLKERRECHT 209 (1982). I also acknowledge invaluable
comments and criticism by Professors Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman, Eugene V.
Rostow, Leon S. Lipson, Harry H. Almond Jr., and Carl Q. Christol, as well as by my friends
and colleagues at the Yale Law School, Adeno Addis, Keith D. Nunes, and Emilio Sahurie.
** Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.; LL.M., Yale University,
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1. The seminal work on the law of outer space, M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL, & I.
VLAsIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963), makes reference to the earth-space arena
as "mankind's most comprehensive community." Id. at 3.
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tional Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The public
order of the geostationary orbit is an annually recurring topic of the
agenda of UNCOPUOS, and the ITU will devote a two-session world
administrative radio conference in 1985 and 1988 to the use of the geo-
stationary orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it. Consensus
has been reached that the geostationary orbit is a limited natural re-
source, the limits of which may soon be reached, and access to which has
to be provided on an equitable basis.
This Article explores the specific nature and community relevance of
the geostationary orbit, the claims raised and trends in decision with re-
spect to its use, and possible regimes under which this finite and precious
resource can be distributed among the numerous claimants in the world
community. It proposes a flexible framework of inclusive control over
the area, based on the view of the orbit as a res publica internationalis.
I. The Factual Setting
A. Physical Characteristics of the Geostationary Orbit
According to Kepler's laws, the orbit plane of a satellite has to cross
the central point of the earth. Most satellites' orbits are elliptical, which
means that their positions relative to the earth change continuously.
That, in turn, requires constant readjustment of antennae of both the
satellite and the ground stations.
However, circular orbits are also available. One of them, the geosta-
tionary orbit 2, encircles the earth some 22,300 miles (35,786 kilometers) 3
above the equator. In this orbit, satellites can be placed so as to turn
2. Terminology varies. The ITU consistently refers to the area as the "geostationary-satel-
lite orbit", defined as "[t]he orbit in which a satellite must be placed to be a geostationary
satellite." Final Acts of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference, Radio Regula-
tions, No. 182, at 47, 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (hereinafter cited as WARC 1979). A geostationary
satellite is described as a "geosynchronous satellite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the
plane of the Earth's equator and which thus remains fixed relative to the Earth; by extension, a
satellite which remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth." Id., Radio Regulations no.
181, at 47. The broadest term is thus "geosynchronous satellite," which is defined as an "earth
satellite whose period of revolution is equal to the period of the rotation of the Earth about its
axis." Id., Radio Regulations no. 180, at 47. UNCOPUOS, on the other hand, refers to the
area as the "geostationary orbit." See, eg., Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 11, U.N. Doe. A/38/20 (1983). The latter
designation, though less precise, has the advantage of brevity.
3. There is some disagreement about the exact altitude of the orbit. Compare C. CHRIS-
TOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 3 (1982) with Gorove, The Geo-
stationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 445 (1979). See also Perek,
Physics, Uses and Regulation of the Geostationary Orbit, or Ex Facto Sequitur Lex, PROC. 20TH
COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 400, 402 (1978) (deriving the figure quoted in the text
from, inter alia, Kepler's Third Law).
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about the polar axis of the earth in the same direction and within the
same period as the earth itself.4 Thus, they appear stationary to the
earth-bound observer, as if fixed in the sky.
The geostationary orbit is a complicated astrophysical phenomenon.
It involves not only the gravitational attraction of the earth, but also
minute forces resulting from the ellipticity of the equator, the attraction
of moon and sun, and solar radiation pressure. The initial position of a
satellite in orbit is determined by its launch and subsequent rocket im-
pulses. Even then, natural forces alone would not keep the device in its
intended place in space; periodic station-keeping maneuvers have to be
made in order to maintain the satellite within tolerances of ± 0.05 de-
grees in both latitude and longitude on this circular orbit5 - the maxi-
mum accuracy achievable with present-day technology.
6
Most satellites orbit at levels well below the geostationary height,7
since it is very costly to elevate space vehicles to that altitude. A geo-
stationary orbit is used primarily when its specific benefits are crucial for
the mission of the satellite, or, to put it differently, when there is no less
expensive substitute. The main advantages of geostationary orbit may be
summed up as follows:
1. The geostationary orbit is the only flight path capable of providing
continuous contact between ground station and satellite without
constant readjustment of antennae.
2. A geostationary satellite has a constant view of a large area of the
earth, and continual visibility from any point within this area is a
precondition for telecommunication.
3. One satellite alone can supply one-third of the earth's surface with
radio signals. Three satellites, therefore, can set up a global tele-
communication network.
4. See supra note 2, and Gorove, supra note 3, at 445.
5. Technical Bases for the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geo-
stationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It (WARC-ORB(1)),
ITU, Report of the CCIR Conference Preparatory Meeting (CPM), Geneva, 25 June-20 July,
1984, (hereinafter cited as Technical Bases), Part II, at 40.
6. Previous technology allowed maximum tolerances of ±0.1 degrees. See Gibbons, Orbi-
tal Saturation: The Necessity for International Regulation of Geosynchronous Orbits, 9 CAL.
WEST. INT'L L. J. 139 (1979). See also Perek, supra note 3, at 403.
7. By the end of 1980, there were 1,058 satellites in earth orbit, sixteen in lunar orbit and
36 in solar/planetary orbit. C. CHRisTOL, supra note 3, at 4. As of December 31, 1982, the
geostationary orbit harbored 108 active and 41 inactive satellites. Physical Nature and Techni-
cal Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit, U.N. Secretariat Study, Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/203/Add.4 at 3 (May 18, 1983) (hereinafter cited
as Physical Nature).
219
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
B. The Uses of the Geostationary Orbit
The main use of the geostationary orbit to date has been for communi-
cations, both domestic and international. Many countries have leap-
frogged the traditional stage of telecommunications via terrestrial cable
by establishing a nationwide satellite communications system. For re-
mote areas of a country, this has often proven to be the only reliable
means of communication.8 Innovative international uses have been de-
veloped continually by Intelsat, including long-distance telephone, telex,
and other record traffic.9 This movement away from cable, wire, or wire-
less transmission is encouraged by a dramatic decrease in the costs of
satellite communications.10 For commercial users, satellites provide ac-
cess to distant computers and data banks; they also promote electronic
publishing. 1
A "technology inversion"' 2 with considerable impact on society is tak-
ing place in the field of television broadcasting. In the dawn of the space
age, signals from tiny satellites could only be received by large, complex,
and expensive earth stations, and then sent to conventional TV transmit-
ters for rebroadcasting. Today's spacecraft are larger, more sophisti-
cated, and powerful, enabling the receiving equipment to become
simpler, smaller, and cheaper.' 3 Thus direct broadcasting by satellite
(DBS)14 was born: direct reception of satellite radio signals through a
dish antenna of 3-4 feet (lm) diameter by individual homes. Early exper-
imental uses of DBS included educational, cultural, and medical pro-
8. Domestic satellite communications systems are operational in Canada, the United
States, the U.S.S.R., Indonesia, Europe, Japan, and India. They are planned for Brazil and the
Arab states. Letter from ITU official (Oct. 17, 1984) (on file with Yale Journal of World
Public Order).
9. Technical Bases, supra note 5, Part II, at 32-33. See also Gibbons, supra note 6, at 140.
10. A satellite of the Intelsat-I series (1965) could only handle 240 telephone calls at a
time, with annual costs per channel amounting to $32,000. Intelsat-IVa (1977) was capable of
handling 8,000 calls at once, at annual per channel cost of only $6,840. E. HERTER & H.
Rupp, NACHRICHTENOBERTRAGUNG OBER SATELLITEN 77 (1979). By July 1984 annual
costs per channel had dropped to $4,680. Intelsat Director General Richard R. Colino. 50
TELEcoMM. REPTS. No. 26, at 22 (July 2, 1984).
11. Perek, supra note 3, at 411.
12. U.N. Chronicle, July 1982, at 54.
13. Id. Indicators of this change are the weights and sizes of antennae carried by satellites.
Intelsats I and III, launched in the 1960s, were equipped with comparatively tiny antennae.
Intelsat-IVa, launched in 1977, weighed 1,500 kg (3,037 pounds), and used an antenna 1.27 by
1.27 m (4 feet). The weight of Intelsat-V (1982) was estimated at 1,950 kg (4,300 pounds), and
its antenna measured 2.44 m across (8 feet). By comparison, the first experimental direct
broadcasting satellite, ATS-6, was equipped with a 9 m (30 feet) antenna, and 3 m (10 feet)
antennae were used to receive its signals. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 3-4.
14. See K. QUEENEY, DIRECr BROADcAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1978), for DBS technology and problems of regulating it.
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grams for developing countries. 15 DBS is now entering the media
markets of highly industrialized states, in particular the United States 16
and Western Europe. 17 Its advent promises tectonic shifts in carefully
balanced internal media structures.
1 8
Another important use of the geostationary corridor is meteorology.
Weather satellites are essential in forecasting and thus mitigating the ef-
fects of natural disasters such as tropical storms,1 9 excessive rainfalls,
and crop-killing frigid weather.20 Since 1979, a global network of five
geostationary meteorological satellites has provided worldwide scientific
information through the World Meteorological Organization's Global
Atmospheric Research Programme.
21
15. ATS-6 beamed these programs to remote areas of India. See supra note 13. It was
launched in 1974. U.N. Chronicle, supra note 12, at 54. Similar projects are now run by the
United States Agency for International Development's Rural Satellite Programme in the West
Indies and Peru with a view towards assisting rural areas in education, health care, and agri-
culture. Another such pilot program was scheduled to begin operation in Indonesia in fall
1983. Remarks of Mr. Sherman, U.S. delegate, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (249th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.249, at 28 (1983)(verbatim record).
16. United Satellite Communications Inc. has provided low-power DBS services since No-
vember 1983. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1984, at 32, col. 1. Comsat's plans to provide high-power
DBS services in the U.S. by 1986 were called off on November 30, 1984. Id., at 31, col. 1.
There are, however, other applicants, of which seven hold a DBS construction permit. Cf In
re Applications of CBS, Inc., et al., FCC 84-477, released Oct. 10, 1984; In re Applications of
Satellite Syndicated Systems, Inc., et al., FCC 84-608 (released Dec. 6, 1984). As to the eco-
nomics of DBS, cf. 107 BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 46.
17. Under the German-French Satellite Treaty of April 29, 1980, two experimental DBS
satellites are to be constructed. The German TV Sat and the French TDF I are planned to be
launched in April 1985, for a pre-operational phase of at least two years. See Gross,
Li'nderkoordinierung in der Medienpolitik, 36 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 437, 442
(1983). The government of Luxembourg has notified the ITU of its intention to beam up to
sixteen channels of programming to virtually every home by 1986. Washington Post, Oct. 13,
1983, at C19, col. 1. The USSR has had an operational DBS system for several years now.
Japan operates a 12 GHz broadcasting satellite system. The Indian national satellite INSAT
carries direct broadcasting transponders in the 2.5 GHz band, just as Arabsat will do, a satel-
lite to be launched in 1985. See supra note 8.
18. For U.S. plans regarding DBS see FCC Report and Order Authorizing DBS, 90 F.C.C.
2d 676, at 678 (1982). See also the FCC's interim rules for the licensing and operation of DBS,
47 Fed. Reg. 31,574 (1982) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 100). For a comprehensive discussion,
see The Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and International Regulation, 37
VAND. L. Rnv. 67 (1984). On the changes in German media law, see Oppermann, Aufdem
Wege zur gemischten Rundfunkverfassung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, JuRIS-
TENzErrUNG 1981, at 721-30.
19. See the remarks of Mr. Garcia (Philippines) regarding efforts by the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO) to mitigate the disastrous consequences of typhoons. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (248th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.248, at 57
(1983)(verbatim record).
20. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 8.
21. U.N. Chronicle, supra note 12, at 51. This is the first global telecommunications net-
work. It is composed of the U.S. satellites GOES I (serving at 75* W) and GOES 2 (140" W),
the ESA-METEOSAT (O* E), the U.S.S.R.'s GOMS (70* E), and the Japanese GMS (140" E).
Perek, supra note 3, at 411. Continued operation of both polar-orbiting and geostationary
weather satellites is essential for the World Weather Watch system.
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Furthermore, geostationary satellites are used to observe the environ-
ment.22 They are also involved in one of the most controversial uses of
satellites: remote sensing.23 This screening and monitoring of the earth's
resources with the help of sophisticated photometric systems allows the
user to identify discrete terrestrial mineral resources, to locate under-
ground water flows, to establish land and forest inventories, 24 to estimate
yields of crops, and to assess the marine environment. 25 It has been said
that "[i]n monetary terms this single application of space science and
technology has made space programs economically viable."'26
A geostationary orbit also offers some disadvantages for remote sens-
ing. Space vehicles in this corridor need more powerful optical systems
to achieve the same spatial resolution as satellites in low orbit. The view
of territories from high altitudes is rather oblique, and one satellite could
serve only part of the world. That is why the U.S. sensing devices, the
Landsat satellites, do not orbit at the geostationary level. However,
among the advantages of this orbit are continuous coverage of the area
within view, and more precise photometric measurements than those
possible with rapidly moving low-orbit satellites. Thus, the United States
plans the launching of a Synchronous Earth Orbiting Satellite (SEOS) for
studying short-lived phenomena such as floods, storms, and pollution.27
One classic use of the geostationary orbit is assistance to navigation.
22. For this purpose, the United States launched in 1983 a Geostationary Operational En-
vironmental Satellite, GOES 6. Monitoring of the environment is also one of Canada's main
uses of space technology.
23. Remote sensing is a longstanding item on the agenda of UNCOPUOS. The latest texts
of draft principles are to be found in the 1983 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work
of its Second Session (21 Mar. - 8 Apr.), Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/320, at 16-21 (1983). The basic conflict is expressed as a battle of principles:
freedom of exploration and use of outer space (invoked by sensing states) versus a state's per-
manent sovereignty over its natural resources, including information about them (invoked by
observed states). See Christol, Remote Sensing and International Law, 5 ANN. AIR & SPACE
L. 375 (1980); C. CHRISrOL, supra note 3, at 720.
24. In 1975 land cover and land use maps were produced for the first time for Boliva with
Landsat imagery. In 1976, Landsat maps were employed to plan Bolivia's national population
and housing census. A similar comprehensive space survey was made of the Mongolian Peo-
ple's Republic with the help of Soviet spacecraft imagery. U.N. Chronicle, supra note 12, at
53. The Amazon basin was also mapped from outer space to aid bridge construction. C.
CHmnrOL, supra note 3, at 8.
25. Landsat imagery is used to assess marine living resources to guide fisheries. See the
remarks of Mr. Howard, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (250th mtg.), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/PV.250, at 27 (1983)(verbatim record).
26. C. CHRIsTOL, supra note 3, at 8. The value of the Landsat program tripled from 1982
to 1983. According to Christol, developing countries "have derived specific benefits" from
Landsat activities. During 1973, one year after Landsat-1, the first remote sensing satellite,
was in orbit, there were more than 13,000 foreign requests for data, and in 1974 and 1975,
between 5,000 and 7,000 requests per month were received by the United States EROS Data
Center. Id.
27. Perek, supra note 3, at 411-12.
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Air traffic especially needs frequent and precise determinations of posi-
tion.28 As to ships and offshore facilities, there is already an international
system of radionavigation via satellite: INMARSAT, in operation since
1982.29 Even for the space shuttle and other spacecraft, communication
and tracking support is now rendered via satellite.30 The COSPAS-SAR-
SAT satellite search and rescue system has already saved nearly 300 lives
in aircraft and maritime emergencies.
31
In addition, some specific research programs have to be performed
from platforms in the geostationary orbit, because these observations
have to be made at wave lengths inaccessible from the ground. That is
true, in particular, for the fields of solar and stellar astronomy as well as
for high-energy and plasma physics.
32
It would be naive, finally, to overlook the fact that the area is also used
in many ways for national security.33 More than one-third of all objects
28. This was made clear by the recent interception of a Korean airliner straying off course
over Soviet territory. An international satellite system for commercial aerial navigation would
assist in preventing such deviations in the future. See generally Perek, supra note 3, at 412; C.
CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 7.
29. INMARSAT has been praised as an "outstanding example of modern international
cooperation overcoming the saturation of frequencies, which caused long delays for shipping."
It also was considered to increase "the efficiency of navigation and the safety of life at sea" and
to contribute to the "important development of transfrontier ground stations." Fawcett, IN-
MARSAT, 5 ENC. PUB. INT'L L. 35, 37 (1983). On the internal level, the United States has
developed MARISAT, a national ocean service.
30. Since its launch in April, 1983, TDRS-A, at 11,000 kg, is the largest communications
satellite ever sent to space. This "Tracking and Data Relay Satellite" is the first link in a
worldwide three-spacecraft system which will provide essential communications and tracking
support and which will eventually replace the network of ground tracking stations now used
with spacecraft in earth orbit. See the remarks of Mr. Sherman, supra note 15, at 31. After
some initial problems, TDRS-A has now been safely deployed in geostationary orbit, and was
already rendering useful services during the Spacelab mission in November and December
1983.
31. Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1984, at A26, col. 4. See also the remarks of Mr. Sherman,
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space supra note 15, at 28. The system's operators
include the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Canada and France. It began its demonstration and evaluation
phase in January 1983, and by summer 1983 had already saved the lives of dozens of citizens
from the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, and Spain, thereby justifying the designation of the
mission by the Russian delegate to UNCOPUOS as a mission truly "international in purpose."
Remarks of Mr. Troyanovsky, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (247th mtg.),
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.247, at 12 (1983)(verbatim record).
32. Perek, supra note 3, at 412.
33. Under the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UN.
Doc. A/Res. 1721 Art. IV(1)(e)(1961), states need only report the general function of a space
object to the Secretary-General of the ITU. This minimal requirement has been criticized as
allowing states to conceal military activities in space, in that "no space mission has ever been
reported by these powers as serving military purposes." Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer
Space and International Law, 26 McGiLL L.J. 135, 191 (1981). The present population of the
geostationary orbit includes 17 active satellites concerned with "research, experiment, meteor-
ology," 74 communications satellites, and 17 "national means of verification and/or early
warning." Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 3. For an account of military space activities, see
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS
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in the geostationary orbit are used for military activities.34 Almost three
quarters of the United States' military communications are performed via
satellites in this corridor. 35 Seventeen satellites in geostationary orbit are
characterized as "national means of verification and/or early warning.
' '36
They perform a crucial function for the maintenance of minimum world
public order by verifying arms control agreements 37 and continuously
monitoring the surface of the earth in order to detect launches of nuclear
missiles. These satellites essentially meet the security concerns lying at
the heart of President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal of 195538 by
providing relative confidence and stability of expectations between the
two superpowers.
The future of the geostationary orbit is bright. For the next century,
CONTROL (1982), especially chapter 5 at 97-114 and Table 5.1, at 110-11 (hereinafter cited as
SIPRI).
34. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 8.
35. POPULAR COM. (hereinafter cited as SIPRI) No. 5, January 1983, at 65. For informa-
tion on Soviet military uses of space, see SIPRI, supra note 33, at 97-114; J. OBERO, RED STAR
IN ORBIT (1981); W. SCHAUER, THE POLITICS OF SPACE (1976); J. CANAN, WAR IN SPACE
(1982); and Hoeber & Dannenberg, Moscow and the Military Use of Space, 32 PROBS. OF COM-
MUNISM 61 (May-June 1983). Some scientists recently suggested using the geostationary orbit
for a 'space-based defense system along the lines proposed by President Reagan. See 38 Der
Spiegel, No. 2, at 118. See also N.Y. Times, March 25, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
36. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 3.
37. Mutual acceptance of both superpowers' surveillance devices is expressed in Article
XII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Agreement) of May 26,
1972, concluded in the framework of SALT I:
(1) For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in
a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
(2) Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verifica-
tion of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
(3) Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty ....
23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
"National technical means of verification" include primarily reconnaissance satellites, but
also seismic and radar monitoring. See Greenwood, Reconnaissance and Arms Control, 228
Sci. AM. 14, 24 (1973). See also M. McDOUGAL & W. REIsMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 510
(1981).
38. See the Statement of the President Proposing Reciprocal Aerial Inspection of July 21,
1955. He suggested to the U.S.S.R.:
to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country - we
to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance,
where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to
study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations,
and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against
the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.
DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1955, 215-216, reprinted in M. McDou-
GAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 37, at 508.
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space structures are envisioned which would collect solar radiation en-
ergy, transform it into microwaves, and send it through an antenna to the
earth. On the ground, a rectifying antenna would receive the microwave
radiation and convert it into electricity.39 The proposed generating ca-
pacity of twenty to thirty of these solar power satellites would equal all
the electric power generated in the U.S. in 1975.40 However, a "dedi-
cated fleet of perhaps five space shuttles each making 100 round trips
would be required to transport the material into low orbit where they
would be assembled into the array and subsequently boosted into geosta-
tionary orbit. The whole operation presumably will require several
years.")4
1
C. Constraints on the Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit
All these uses have to take place in a tunnel-like ring of about 161,500
miles in circumference. Each degree of the are thus represents 448
miles. 42 Spacecraft have to be accommodated on this orbital belt like
pearls on a string. As stated above, the highest accuracy of station-keep-
ing that can be achieved with present-day technology is ± 0.05*.43
The danger of physical collision of spacecraft is the first, physical, con-
straint to the use of-this orbit. In order to avert it, satellites have to be
placed at a distance of 0.10 from one another.44 Inclusive decision-mak-
ing processes, until very recently, did not take this factor into account.
Thus, the 1977 ITU World Administrative Radio Conference for the
39. Perek, supra note 3, at 412. The nature of microwave transmission does not differ
basically from other uses of the spectrum except for density. However, its purpose is different:
power transmission instead of telecommunications. As to the frequencies under consideration,
2.45 GHz is preferred. Gorove, Legal Aspects of Solar Power Satellites. Focus on Microwave
Standards, PROC. 22ND COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1 (1980).
These solar power satellites will be huge. Estimates range from energy gathering arrays of
50 km 2 to collecting areas of 100-200 km2 with a thermal concentrator of 30 km2. See C.
CHRisTOL, supra note 3, at 4; Perek, supra note 3, at 412. The weight of the solar cells alone
would approximate 20 tons. See Wiewiorowska, Legal and Political Problems of the Solar
Power Stations in Space, PRoc. 22ND COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 23 (1980).
A station's antenna for microwave transmission will measure 1 km in diameter and will
beam the solar power down to earth in a corridor of roughly 10 km2 . The receiving antenna
will measure 8.5 by 11 km2. C. CHRisTOL, supra note 3, at 4; Perek, supra note 3, at 412;
Gorove, supra at 2.
40. Gorove, supra note 39, at 1. Estimates of output from each solar station range from 5
to 10 GW. See Dupas, Problems of Satellite Solar Power Stations, PRoc. 22ND COLL. ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 273, 274 (1980); Perek, supra note 3, at 412.
41. Wiewiorowska, supra note 39, at 23. Dupas points out that there must be about 50,000
launchings of heavy lift vehicles between the years 2000 and 2025 to build 100 5 GW solar
power stations. Dupas, supra note 40, at 274.
42. Gibbons, supra note 6, at 148.
43. Technical Bases, supra note 5, Part II, at 40.
44. This figure is, to be sure, subject to changes with advances in the technology of station-
keeping.
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Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service (WARC-BS) assigned to
seven states the "nominal orbital position" of 190 W.45 Even if such
nominal positions could be subdivided, satellites would come very close
together at the borders of their slots. Some such close encounters leading
to emergency evasive maneuvers have already taken place,46 disproving
earlier expectations that there would be no practical problem of collisions
between active satellites.47 The greatest collision hazard in geostationary
orbit, however, is posed by the increasing amount of space debris, i.e.,
inactive, drifting and disintegrating space objects. If fuel for course cor-
rections runs out, the satellite is acted upon by natural forces only. It
then performs a "figure 8" of increasing size combined with a slow oscil-
lation in longitude,48 until it finally comes to rest in a new geostationary
location at either one of two stable points: at about 90* W, above the
Galapagos Islands, or at about 80* E, south of Sri Lanka.49 Data from
Early Bird and other Intelsat satellites confirm that inactive satellites
stray in altitude by about _- 60 km from the nominal value, with inclina-
tions exceeding 0.5*. They traverse the equatorial plane daily within an
annular lane 120 km wide, with an area 32 by 100 km2 . New active
satellites stray in altitude only up to ±L 15 km. They have thus been
called "ducks sitting in the central part of the lane," waiting to be hit by
45. That nominal slot for DBS is shared by Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Gross, supra note 17, at 442-
43; ITU, 22ND REPORT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER
SPACE (1983). However, the 1977 WARC-BS Plan for DBS was based on a uniform spacing of
6*. The 1983 DBS Plan for Region 2 (the Americas) is based on non-uniform spacing, but
even in satellite clusters a minimum distance of h0.1" in the east-west direction has to be kept
by each spacecraft. Final Acts of the Regional Administrative Conference for the Planning of
the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Region 2, July 17, 1983, Part II, p. 38 (a copy of this
preliminary version has been kindly made available to me by the FCC)(on file with the Yale
Journal of World Public Order) (hereinafter cited as SAT-83). According to the current ITU
rules, the "tolerance is ±0.1" for satellites using fixed-satellite and broadcasting-satellite allo-
catios and L0.5* for other satellites with further relaxations in certain circumstances."
Technical Bases, supra note 5, Part II, at 99.
46. Within a sample of 21 satellites observed over a six month period in the second half of
1981, there were 120 predicted encounters within a 50 km miss distance. Several close ap-
proach predictions in the 1 to 5 km range resulted in collision avoidance maneuvers. FLT-
SATCOM-1, operating at 100" W, had eight close encounters with SBS-1, five of which were
between 2.6 km and 6.0 km. and five additional close encounters with four other satellites.
Due to inaccuracies in determining spacecraft positions and orbits, a finite probability of colli-
sion existed in most of these situations. Wolfe, Chobotov & Bond, Man-Made Space Debris
Implications for the Future, cited in Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 8-9. Collisions with
military satellites such as FLTSATCOM could arouse fears that an anti-satellite weapon had
been used and so gravely endanger world peace. Id.
47. Perek, supra note 3, at 404.
48. Id. at 403.
49. Valters, Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite Communication, 5 STAN. J. INT'L
STUD. 53, 71 (1970). A more recent source locates these stable points at about 75* E and 105"
W. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 7.
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these drifting satellites passing through.50
Damage arising from such collisions can be considerable. Although
the relative velocity at the moment of impact may vary from near zero to
very high speeds, typically it is of the order of about 500 km/h if the
inclinations of the orbits are 1-2, and double that value for inclinations
around 5*.I A collision at 10 km/s would eject from a satellite 115
times the mass of the impacting debris.5 2 With present-day tracking
technology, it is possible to detect debris of about 10 cm size in low
orbits5 3 and pieces of 1 m size in the geostationary orbit.
5 4
The average lifetime of a geostationary satellite is about ten years.55 As
of December 31, 1982, there were already at least 41 inactive satellites
and 20 non-functional objects in the geostationary orbital belt, besides
the active population of 108 satellites.5 6 Not only near-miss situations,
57
but also some recent malfunctions of satellites have been ascribed to col-
lisions with space debris, one of them involving a geostationary space
object.5 8 At present, the probability of damage to a satellite lies in the
range of 1-10% for a 100m sphere in orbit within a period of 1,000
days. 59 This collision hazard will be even greater for large space struc-
tures such as solar power satellites. With an area of up to 100 km2 cov-
50. Perek, supra note 3, at 404.
51. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 8.
52. Kessler & Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a
Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL REsEARCH 2637 (1978), cited in Perek, Outer Space Activities
versus Outer Space, PROC. 22ND COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 283, 284 (1980).
53. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 8. About 3,500 debris objects have been discovered
in earth orbit. Escaping radar detection is an unknown quantity of small debris (e.g., nuts,
bolts, etc.) that may do serious harm to a satellite in a collision. See supra note 52.
54. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 8.
55. See id. at Annex, Tables 1-3 (surveys of geostationary space stations and their periods
of validity). See also C. CHRisrOL, supra note 3, at 548.
56. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 3. Another account lists 103 non-functional objects
and inactive satellites in geostationary orbit, 56 of which have not been tracked recently.
Chobotov, The Collision Hazard in Space, 30 J. ASTRONAUTICAL SCIENCES 191 (1982). The
differences in enumeration are due to the fact that some non-functioning objects are too small
for detection or either have never transmitted signals or have ceased signalling. Physical Na-
ture, supra note 7, at 3.
57. In May 1980, it was estimated that FLTSATCOM-1 and IMEWS-4, both U.S. mili-
tary satellites, would pass close to each other. The predicted miss distance was given as 9.4
kin, then reduced a few days later to 3.5 km. Uncertainty in the estimates exceeded the pre-
dicted miss distances by 10 km and 20 km respectively, and FLTSATCOM-1 had to undertake
evasive maneuvers to escape collision. Johnson, The Crowded Sky, 24 SPACEFLIGHT 446
(1982).
58. This object was the European Space Agency's GEOS-2 satellite, the solar panels of
which were damaged. Wrenn, Geos 2 in Space Collision?, 274 NATURE 631 (1978). Collision
with space debris might also have been the cause of malfunction of Cosmos 954. Sedov, Cos-
mos 954, 20 SPACEFLIGHT 184 (1978). A recent U.N. Study lists serious damage to "several"
satellites outside the geostationary orbit as probably caused by space debris. Physical Nature,
supra note 7, at 8.
59. Perek, supra note 52, at 284.
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ered by them, they would suffer one collision on the average of every five
years - a factor of significance, since their projected lifetime is thirty
years.60
In addition to this danger of physical collision of spacecraft, there is
another factor limiting the use of the geostationary orbit: spectrum scar-
city. Very few satellites, and virtually none in geostationary orbit, can
perform any meaningful function without communication links with one
or more ground stations; for some satellites, communications are the sole
reason for their existence. 61 The availability of radio frequencies is lim-
ited, however, by the need to avoid interference with or by other signals.
Regulation of the radio frequency spectrum 62 is of prime inclusive con-
cern.63 Since the Washington Conference of 192764, the ITU has been
empowered to coordinate the use of frequencies to avoid harmful inter-
ference65 between participants transmitting on the same or adjacent parts
of the spectrum.
66
The ITU's regulatory activity, sometimes called its "legislative pro-
cess, '" 67 takes place in three steps. First, a number of potential uses or
applications of the spectrum representing competing demands, the so-
called "radiocommunication services,"' 68 are identified. Then, the organ-
60. Perek, supra note 3, at 404-405.
61. Id. at 405.
62. Radio frequency is measured in Hertz (Hz), the number of cycles of a radio wave that
pass a fixed point within one second. Theoretically, the electromagnetic spectrum runs from 0
Hz to infinity. The part of the spectrum usable for telecommunications, as determined by the
ITU, ranges only from 3,000 Hz (3 kHz) to 3,000 billion Hz (3,000 GHz). This radio spec-
trum is divided into nine frequency bands, ranging in decimal steps from 3-30 kHz up to 300-
3,000 GHz. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations, no. 208, at 49. The term "fre-
quency band", however, is also used to denote the exact range of frequencies allocated to a
specific communication service. Id., Table of Frequency Allocations, nos. 437-443, especially
no. 438, at 65.
63. The possibility of interference has necessitated coordination of use since the invention
of the electric telegraph in 1835. It is not a matter of chance that the ITU, created in 1865 as
the International Telegraph Union, has been the first international organization of universal
character. See Noll, International Telecommunication Union, 5 ENc. PUB. INT'L L. 177-78
(1983).
64. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3
(1982).
65. "Interference" has been defined by the ITU as the "effect of unwanted energy due to
one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocom-
munication system, manifested by any performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of
information. . . ." WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 160, at 46. Regarding
interference with transmissions to and from geostationary satellites, see Jeruchim, A Survey of
Interference Problems and Applications to Geostationary Satellite Networks, 65 PROC. INST.
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS 317 (1977).
66. International Telecommunication Convention of October 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495,
T.I.A.S. No. 8572, art. 35 (hereinafter cited as ITC).
67. D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 19 (1970).
68. A "radiocommunication service" is defined as "involving the transmission, emission
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ization's world administrative radio conferences (WARCs) will allocate
specific frequency bands to these services. 69 This distribution is pub-
lished in the ITU's Table of Frequency Allocations. In a second phase,
plans may be drawn up, at regional or specific world administrative radio
conferences, by virtue of which frequency channels are allotted to indi-
vidual countries or groups of countries for use for the services specified.
70
Finally, states assign frequencies or channels to their domestic appli-
cants, individual radio stations.
71
These assignments must be reported to the ITU. Within that organi-
zation, the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) - a
committee of five members with the constitutional mandate, not to re-
present their home countries or regions, but to act as "custodians of an
international public trust"72 - is empowered to examine the national
notice, correspond with the notifying state, issue findings with regard to
conformity to existing prescriptions, state the possibility that a noticed
frequency would produce harmful interference with previously recorded
assignments, and formulate recommendations in such a situation, as well
as finally record the assignment in the Master International Frequency
Register.73 Conflicts between old users of a frequency and prospective
new ones are decided in favor of the first to notify and to use the con-
tested part of the spectrum 74 in accordance with ITU prescriptions. The
ITU's Radio Regulations state that only this assignment enjoys the
and/or reception of radio waves for specific telecommunication purposes." WARC 1979,
supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 20, at 33. The Regulations list 37 such services, including
broadcasting, radionavigation, fixed and mobile uses and uses in space. Id., Radio Regulations
nos. 20-57, at 33-36.
69. "Allocation" is defined as "[e]ntry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given
frequency band for the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or space radiocommunica-
tion services or the radio-astronomy service under specified conditions." Id., Radio Regula-
tions no. 17, at 33.
70. "Allotment" is the "[e]ntry of a designated frequency channel in an agreed plan,
adopted by a competent conference, for use by one or more administrations for a radiocom-
munication service in one or more identified countries or geographical areas and under speci-
fied conditions." Id., Radio Regulations no. 18, at 33.
71. "Assignment" is defined as the "[a]uthorization given by an administration for a radio
station to use a radio frequency channel under specified conditions." Id., Radio Regulations
no. 19, at 33.
72. ITC, supra note 66, art. 10(2).
73. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations nos. 990-1006, at 159-60. See also C.
CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 553; Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 4.
74. Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 3-4; Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio
Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, at 307 (1979). See also D.
SMITH, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL 30 (1969) ("frequencies are still
assigned on a time priority basis rather than based on equitable principles"). For a somewhat
different view, see D. LEIVE, supra note 67, at 23 ("In many disputes first use of a frequency is
not a controlling factor, and often is not even relevant to a determination of the respective
rights of the parties concerned."). See also C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 555-68.
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"right to international protection from harmful interference . . .,75
New users thus have to "engineer their systems around the earlier
ones" 76 or seek agreement with existing users. The latter have to accom-
modate the newcomer only to the extent that "such change is acceptable
to administration or administrations concerned, ' 77 which leaves control
over the frequency in their hands. This doctrine of prior notification78 is
summarized in the slogan "first-come, first-served.
'79
Inclusive legislative processes with respect to space communications
started the same way: with the definition of several types of space serv-
ices80 and the allocation of frequency bands in which these services could
operate. However, in contrast to the quiet world one century ago, satel-
lite communications entered an environment "deeply immersed in a
cacophony of electronic communications." ' Optimal satellite frequen-
cies, from around 1 to 10 GHz, were already allocated among several
terrestrial services. Thus, frequency sharing between satellite and terres-
trial users was introduced by the 1963 extraordinary Administrative Ra-
dio Conference for Space.82 The IFRB was entrusted with coordination
of such simultaneous use of radio waves.83 Nevertheless, the traditional
"first in time, first in right" rule of international communications law still
prevailed.8
4
75. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 1416, at 199. Such frequency as-
signments are entered in Column 2a ("Registration") of the Master Register. However, the
IFRB's "quasi-judicial" authority is rather limited. D. LEIvE, supra note 67, at 20. If a state
insists that a noticed frequency assignment be recorded, even though it contravenes ITU pre-
scriptions and/or will interfere with previously recorded uses, the IFRB must do so. However,
it will be entered only in Column 2b ("Notification"), "in order that administrations may take
into account the fact that the frequency assignment concerned is in use." In general, this
recording "shall not give the right to international protection to the frequency assignment
concerned .. " WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 1417, at 200.
76. Jackson, The Allocation of the Radio Spectrum, 242 Sci. AM. 34, at 38 (1980).
77. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 1449, at 203.
78. Ickowitz, The Role of the International Telecommunication Union in the Settlement of
Harmful Interference Disputes, 13 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 82, 87 (1974).
79. Valters, supra note 49, at 76-77.
80. 18 of the 37 communication services identified by ITU in its latest Radio Regulations
are space-related: the Fixed-Satellite Service, the Inter-Satellite Service, the Space Operation
Service, the Mobile-Satellite Service, the Land Mobile-Satellite Service, the Maritime Mobile-
Satellite Service, the Aeronautical Mobile-Satellite Service, the Broadcasting-Satellite Service,
the Radiodetermination-Satellite Service, the Radionavigation-Satellite Service, the Maritime
Radionavigation-Satellite Service, the Aeronautical Radionavigation-Satellite Service, the
Earth Exploration Satellite Service, the Meteorological Satellite Service, the Standard Fre-
quency and Time Signal-Satellite Service, the Space Research Service, the Amateur-Satellite
Service, and the Radio Astronomy Service. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations nos.
21-57, at 33-36.
81. Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 5.
82. Id. at 5-6.
83. Id. at 6; D. LEIVE, supra note 67, at 228-34.
84. A. CHAYES, SATELLITE BROADCASTING 18 (1973). ITU Secretary-General Mili
stated in 1968 that "[t]he ITU will certainly continue in the future to deal with satellite links as
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This began to change with a series of ITU conferences in the 1970's.
The first one, the World Administrative Radio Conference on Space
Telecommunications (WARC-ST) of 1971, established that first use and
registration did not give rise to any "permanent priority."8 5 The 1973
Plenipotentiary Conference, rewriting the International Telecommunica-
tion Convention, declared space services and the geostationary orbit to
be "limited natural resources," to which access should be provided on an
equitable basis.8 6 Furthermore, the IFRB was entrusted with another
function, to "effect. . . an orderly recording of the positions assigned by
countries to geostationary satellites .... 187 Thus, a direct link was es-
tablished between frequency assignments and orbital positions occupied
by spacecraft having the capacity to make use of such frequencies,
mainly with the argument that it is "impossible to consider separately"
the orbit and the spectrum resource. 8 In a drive for equitable access,
frequencies and "nominal orbital positions"8 9 were assigned90 to individ-
ual countries for use in the Broadcasting-Satellite Service9' at ITU con-
ferences in 1977, 1979, and 1983.92 Planning of further space services is
envisioned for the 1985-88 World Administrative Radio Conference on
the Use of the Geostationary Orbit.
93
This intense inclusive concern along with new technologies reduced
the specific constraints on the use of the geostationary corridor due to
spectrum scarcity. Up until very recently, it was believed that satellites
it has done in the past for other means of telecommunication." 35 ITU TELECOMM. J. 240
(1968).
85. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunica-
tions of July 17, 1971, Resolution Spa 2-1, 23 U.S.T. 1527, 1820, T.I.A.S. No. 7435 (hereinaf-
ter cited as WARC-ST).
86. ITC, supra note 66, at art. 33(2).
87. Id., at art. 10(3)(b).
88. Thus the physical space resource and the radio spectrum are lumped together into the
"nominal orbit/spectrum" in Butler, World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning
Broadcasting Satellite Service, 5 J. SPACE L. 93 (1977). The author is the Secretary-General of
the ITU.
89. This term is defined in ITU's Radio Regulations as the "longitude of a position in the
geostationary-satellite orbit associated with a frequency assignment to a space station in a
space radiocommunication service. The position is given in degrees from the Greenwich me-
ridian." WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations, Appendix 30, Annex 8, no. 1.4, at 665.
90. Correct use of this term is questioned by Christol, since entry of designated frequency
channels in a plan for use by "administrations," i.e., member states, is "allotment" under ITU
regulations. C. CHmsroi, supra note 3, at 600 n. 102.
91. The term is defined as a "radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or
retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public."
WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 37, at 35.
92. Final Acts, World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broad-
casting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GIz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5
GHz (in Region 1), 1977 (hereinafter cited as WARC-BS), reprinted in WARC 1979, supra
note 2, Appendix 30, at 605; SAT-83, supra note 45.
93. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution BP, at 744.
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had to be placed at a distance of 4* from one another to avoid interfer-
ence, if they transmitted on the same frequency. With only two frequen-
cies available, a 2* separation between neighboring satellites was said to
be required. This factor would have narrowed the number of satellites
capable of accommodation in the geostationary orbit to 180.
94
However, further frequency bands were allocated to space services at
WARC 1979. 95 For the broadcasting-satellite service alone, the 1977
WARC-BS assigned frequencies for 162 space stations at 36 positions in
the orbit.96 The 1983 Regional Plan for the Americas accommodated
2,058 space stations at 48 closely spaced orbital positions by judiciously
using technical means such as cross-polarization, assignment to adjacent
satellites of widely separated service areas, proper choice of channels,
and minimization of spatial separation between satellites.97 It may be
impossible to determine the maximum number of geostationary satellites
by reference to spectrum scarcity.98 However, the self-interest of nations
in reliable communications free from interference will continue to favor
inclusive regulation of the spectrum, and thus limit access to space com-
munications frequencies which are, in turn, conditions sine qua non for
the use of the geostationary orbit. Finally, besides the collision hazard
and spectrum scarcity, other man-made and natural interferences with
the functions of satellites limit the use of this precious resource.
Twice a year, for four consecutive days, a satellite appears to pass so
close to the solar disc that communications are interrupted. This solar
94. E. HERTFR & H. Rupp, supra note 10, at 22-23; von Kries, The Legal Status of Geo-
stationary Orbit - Introductory Report, PROC. 18TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 27,
31 (1975); Busak, Geostationary Satellites and the Law, 39 ITT TELECOMM. J. 487 (1972);
Gibbons, supra note 6, at 147.
95. Frequency allocations for space services in the MHz and GHz ranges were already
made at the 1971 WARC-ST. See C. CHRIsTOL, supra note 3, at 558. Regarding allocations at
the WARC 1979, see Gorove, The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979: Some Legal
and Political Implications, 29 ZtrrsCHRIFr FUR LuFr- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 214 (1980).
96. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 4.
97. See The Regional Broadcasting-Satellite Conference for the Americas, 50 ITU
TELECOMM. J. 438, 439 (1983). See also SAT-83, supra note 45. In ITU language, the term
"space station" is not identical to "satellite." A space station is a station (one or more trans-
mitters or receivers or a combination of transmitters and receivers) located on an object which
is beyond, is intended to go beyond, or has been beyond, the major portion of the earth's
atmosphere. See WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 61, at 37. A satellite is a
"body which revolves around another body of preponderant mass and which has a motion
primarily and permanently determined by the force of attraction of that other body." Id.,
Radio Regulations no. 171, at 47. Several space stations, in other words, may be located on a
single satellite, provided the uses are compatible. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 2; Perek,
supra note 3, at 412. The main policy underlying the 1983 DBS Plan for the Americas has
been "clustering" satellites at nominal orbital positions within 0.4* -wide ranges of the orbital
arc. SAT-83, supra note 45, at art. 3.3, Part I, p.2.
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outage lasts for up to six minutes. Another source of involuntary pauses
of transmission is shadowing, i.e. the occultation of the sun by other ob-
jects. Most satellites are operated with solar energy backed up by batter-
ies. If occultation of the sun cuts off this source of power for a longer
period than that for which the batteries had been designed, the functions
of the spacecraft will be interrupted. The earth can eclipse the sun for 72
minutes on the days of the vernal and autumnal equinoxes. 99 The moon
eclipses the sun very rarely, and for only one minute. 1°°
The shadow thrown by other satellites is more than 100 times larger
than their dimensions. This will present serious problems with the ad-
vent of large space structures. A 20 km solar power station, for example,
will throw a shadow extending over 2,000 kin, a length corresponding to
almost 3* of longitude on the orbital arc.101
This cursory review of satellite technology and spectrum management
leads to four conclusions:
1. The geostationary orbit is not a unitary resource in fixed supply,
but a composite resource made up of a physical space (satellites'
orbital locations) and an electromagnetic spectrum element (fre-
quencies).10 2 It has dimensions of place, time, bandwidth, and
strength.
2. This resource is finite, but non-depleting. It is used, not con-
sumed, and it is wasted when it is not used. 0 3 Inactive satellites'
frequencies can be taken over by other space stations immediately
after transmissions end. Spacecraft can be removed from geosta-
tionary orbit, 1°4 thus releasing their slot for potential successors.
3. In certain more popular parts of the orbit, the radio spectrum is
99. Perek, supra note 3, at 405-06. Because of this lack of illumination of solar cells during
equinoctial eclipses, broadcasting satellites are situated further to the west than the region to
be served. Thus, satellites servicing Europe are stationed above the Atlantic, where they
presented problems of interference with stations in the Americas, particularly Brazil. Interre-
gional coordination procedures had to be applied. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 571.
100. Perek, supra note 3, at 406.
101. Perek, supra note 52, at 285.
102. See Wihlborg & Wijkman, Outer Space Resources in Efficient and Equitable Use: New
Frontiers for Old Principles, 24 J. L. & ECON. 23, 28 (1981).
103. See, as to the spectrum element, JOINT TECHNICAL ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS AND THE ELECTRONIC INDUS-
TRIES ASSOCIATION, RADIO SPECTRUM UTILIZATION: A PROGRAM FOR THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 3-6 (1965), cited in D. LEIVE, supra note 67, at 15-16.
104. There are three ways to remove satellites from geostationary orbit: (1) pushing the
spacecraft into the earth's atmosphere, (2) pushing it out of the earth's gravitational field, and
(3) placing it in a disposal orbit. All this could be done by using up the craft's last energy
resources. For the conditions under which each method would be most efficient and economi-
cal, see Study on the Dynamics of Space Objects, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/259, at 12-19 (1980). Inactive drifting space objects pose serious
threats to active satellites. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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already congested; this is true, in particular, for the 6/4 GHz band
pair used on nearly all commercial networks providing point-to-
point communications, such as telephony, television, teleconfer-
encing and data transmission. The next band pair approaching
congestion is 14/11-12 GHz.105 As of December 31, 1982, there
were 169 space objects in the geostationary orbital lane, of which
no more than 108 were active.106 The number of geostationary
satellites has increased by 18% annually over the last decade.107
It is estimated that a total of 330 satellites will crowd the corridor
by 1990.108 Besides the Indian Ocean, problems are particularly
pressing in the orbit segments above the Americas and the Atlan-
tic Ocean.10 9
4. For some purposes, use of geostationary orbit is indispensable.
For others, it may be only convenient, and the same results can be
reached by using other orbits110 or terrestrial resources.111 In these
latter cases, processes of substitution will occur.
The ITU has called the geostationary orbit a "limited natural resource."
Controversies about whether both adjectives are borne out by the facts112
105. Technical Bases, supra note 5, Part I, at 22 and Part II, at 32-34 (need for "complex
and costly" coordination processes).
106. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 3. On the same day, the ITU reported 243 space
stations, of which 83 had been registered, 92 were in the coordinating process under the rele-
vant Radio Regulations, and 68 were advance publications by member states. Id. at 4.
107. U.N. Chronicle, supra note 12, at 58.
108. Christol, International Space Law and the Use of Natural Resources: Solar Energy, 15
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 28, 30 (1980).
109. These are the only ones suitable for broadcasting, telephone and other communica-
tions in and between the United States and Europe, for such satellites require a direct line of
sight to the area they serve. First users of solar power stations probably will also be the highly
industrialized nations of the West, thus further increasing congestion on this part of the orbit.
Gibbons, supra note 6, at 147. Evidence of scarcity is abundant. In an interoffice memoran-
dum of March 10, 1980, the FCC Chief of Satellite Systems Branch reported that "satisfactory
orbit locations cannot be found for all existing or soon-to-be-filed applications." Note, Com-
munication Satellites and the Geostationary Orbit: Reconciling Equitable Access with Efficient
Use, 14 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 859, 879 (1982). On April 24, 1980, the FCC closed the
door on filings for domestic satellite systems, citing, inter alia, the unavailability of orbital
locations. See Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 8.
110. Remote sensing and a variety of other scientific satellites are already operating in
other orbits for the most part. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. They do not contrib-
ute significantly to the congestion of the geostationary orbit, nor do the four or five meteoro-
logical satellites which suffice to provide coverage for the whole planet. The major use of the
geostationary orbit is for communications satellites; alternative orbits for them include eccen-
tric 12-hour and 24-hour orbits. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 5-7; see also Technical
Bases, supra note 5, Part I, at 9-17, and Part II, at 32-71, reporting the degree of use of the
geostationary orbit by the various space services.
111. Increased use of fiber-optic technology could make terrestrial lines, in particular
transoceanic cables, attractive substitutes for satellites.
112. Pointing to the fact that an orbital slot is reusable after the death and removal of a
satellite, Kosuge has questioned the appropriateness of calling the geostationary orbit a "lim-
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shrink into scholastic insignificance before the need to devise ways and
means to prevent this scramble for ever-fewer "places in the sun" from
bursting into open violence. Beyond its impact on national economies,
113
this resource has become vital to the world social process and of ever-
increasing importance to the value processes of individuals and territorial
communities.114 It is imperative to build the public order of the geosta-
tionary orbit.
II. Claims Relating to the Geostationary Orbit
Law does not arise automatically from technical necessities as per-
ceived by an orderly mind. It is not a static body of rules enshrined in
treaties, statutes, and textbooks. Law is a continuing process of interac-
tion in which, at the global level, decision-makers of individual territorial
communities unilaterally put forward claims such as those relating to the
use of the geostationary corridor. The claims of these elites are often
conflicting and mutually exclusive, and other decision-makers, external
to the demanding state and including both national and international offi-
cials, weigh and appraise these competing claims in light of the interests
of the world community and the identity and base values of the rival
ited resource." Kosuge, National Appropriation of Geostationary Satellite Orbit, PROC. 21sT
COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31, 33 (1979). However, there is always some limit to
the number of satellites that can occupy the orbit at any given time. See Rosenfield, Solar
Energy and the "Common Heritage of Mankind," PROC. 21ST COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 58, 63 (1979). Space-resource states have taken pains to explain that orbital slots are
not totally natural phenomena. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 455. This truism tends to
overshadow the fact that the major cause for the geostationary effect is the attraction of the
total mass of the earth. See supra notes 3, 5. Only in theory could an "artificial" geostationary
satellite be created through the use of strong station-keeping propulsion in some alternate
orbit. In practice the fuel expenditure would be prohibitive. Perek, supra note 3, at 402.
113. A 1982 congressional study states that "within a single generation the communication
and information industry has become one of the most vital in the world." The United States
has a 45 % share of the world market for telecommunication electronics and computer equip-
ment which is estimated at $250 billion per year, with an annual growth rate of 10-15%.
Worldwide revenues from telecommunication services alone exceeded $170 billion in 1980.
Net income for major communication carriers has grown in recent years, and potential inves-
tors are anxious to invest in satellite hardware. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, RADIOFREQUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT: IMPACTS FROM THE WORLD
ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF 1979 28 (1982). See also Buyers and Sellers in
Space, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1981, at 96; Menter, Commercial Participation in Space
Activities, 9 J. SPACE L. 53 (1981); Smith & Rothblatt, Geostationary Platforms: Legal Estates
in Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 31 (1982).
114. Its use is becoming critically important for all the values described in H. LASSWELL
& A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950) and in Lasswell & Holmberg, Toward a General
Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional Development, in COMPARATIVE THE-
ORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE 12 (1966): enlightenment (scientific exploration), skill (technical
accomplishments), well-being (broadcasting, search and rescue missions), respect (dissemina-
tion of information by DBS), rectitude (cultural and religious transmissions), affection (trans-
frontier broadcasting, individual communications), but in particular wealth (communications
industry, remote sensing, solar energy), and power (military activities).
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claimants, and -ultimately accept or reject them. "As such a process, it is
a living, growing law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning expecta-
tions of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and expec-
tations are changed by the exigencies of new interests and technology and
by other continually evolving conditions in the world arena."115
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, law is essentially a
matter of choice. Prescriptions do not flow, like the laws of natural sci-
ence, from immutable experience and observation. Kepler's laws are but
factual limits, objective ramifications of the bulk of highly flexible rules
designed to guide human behavior. Often, these rules are inherited;
sometimes, they are fairly novel, like the general public order of outer
space. Always, they are subject to change.
Second, resource control and exploitation are subject to various re-
gimes, or public orders, which have developed over time in the process of
continuous interaction as outlined above. The regimes differ according to
the nature of the resource, the conditions necessary for its optimum use,
including its conservation, and the prevailing socio-economic context.
Common interests may be furthered by allocating competence "exclu-
sively," i.e. by reserving use for a single state, or "inclusively," i.e. in
ways that include the entire community.1 6 Thus "sectoral world or-
ders"' 17 have emerged, differing ratione materiae as well as temporis.
The composite resource of the geostationary orbit, as defined above,
constitutes-like land, air, water, minerals, and plants, and human re-
sources-a critical variable and important base value in the world social
process."18 Claims to its control and use can be arranged on a sliding
scale from intense exclusive control to the most extreme forms of shared,
inclusive competence.
A. Claims to Exclusive Control Over the Geostationary Orbit
On December 3, 1976, eight equatorial countries' 19 proclaimed their
115. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM.
J. INT'L L. 356, 357 (1955). See also Almond, A Public Order in Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes: The Will of the World Community and the Constitutive Process, PROC. 22ND COLL.
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 83 (1980).
116. M. McDoUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 37, at 432-34.
117. Graf Vitzthum, The Search for Sectoral World Orders, ASPEKTE DER SEERECHTS-
ENTWICKLUNG 273 (W. Graf Vitzthum ed. 1980).
118. M. ARSANJANI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL RESOURCES: A
STUDY OF LAW AND POLICY 3 (1981).
119. Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire; Brazil sent an
observer. Gabon and Somalia later joined the Declaration. Galloway, The Current Status of
the Geostationary Orbit, PRoc. 21sT COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 22 (1979). The
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"national sovereignty" over the segments of the geostationary orbit lying
above their respective territories. In the basic communique, the Declara-
tion of Bogotfi, this vertical extension of exclusive competency is justified
by reference to astrophysics:
Equatorial countries declare that the geostationary synchronous orbit is a
physical fact linked to the reality of our planet because its existence depends
exclusively on its relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the
earth, and that is why it must not be considered part of the outer space. 120
This argument is joined by a reference to United Nations resolutions on
permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations121 and/or states122 over
their wealth and natural resources. Qualification of the geostationary or-
bit as such a natural resource, however, would not, by itself, allocate it to
a discrete territorial community. Thus the claim basically is one founded
on contiguity, an age-old mode of acquisition or myth invoked to con-
done extensions of exclusive control.
123
The consequences drawn from this claim are stated clearly:
The devices to be placed permanently on the segment of a geostationary
orbit of an equatorial state shall require previous and expressed authoriza-
tion on the part of the concerned state, and the operation of the device
should conform with the national law of that territorial country over which
it is placed. . . .Equatorial countries do not condone the existing satellites
or the position they occupy on their segments of the Geostationary Orbit
nor does the existence of said satellites confer any rights of placement of
satellites or use of the segment unless expressly authorized by the state exer-
cising sovereignty over this segment.124
Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,1 25 prohibiting national ap-
propriation of outer space, was swept away with the argument that lack
of definition of its scope of application ratione loci implies that it "should
not apply to the geostationary orbit. .... -126 Even if this orbit were
120. Declaration of Bogota 2, 15 REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 48, AT 49 (1980).
121. Declaration of Bogori., supra note 120, at 50, referring to G.A. Res. 2692, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 63, U.N. Doec. A/8028 (1971) (Permanent sovereignty over natural
resources of developing countries and expansion of domestic sources of accumulation for eco-
nomic development).
122. Declaration of Bogotd, supra note 120, at 5, referring to the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Dec.
A/9631 (1974).
123. See D. SCHENK, KONTIGUITAT ALS ERWERBSTITEL IM VOLKERRECHT (1978). Ef-
fective occupation of a res nullius could not possibly have been asserted, because only one
participant, Indonesia, has actually placed satellites in orbit.
124. Declaration of BogotA, supra note 120, at 51.
125. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of January 27, 1967. 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (hereinafter cited as 1967 Treaty).
126. Declaration of BogotAl, supra note 120, at 52.
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covered by the Treaty, Article II could not:
be considered as a final answer to the problem of the exploration and use of
outer space, even less when the international community is questioning all
the terms of international law which were elaborated when the developing
countries could not count on adequate scientific advice and were thus not
able to observe and evaluate the omissions, contradictions and conse-
quences of the proposals which were prepared with great ability by the in-
dustrialized powers for their own benefit.127
In any event, the Bogota signatories claimed that the current users
were in violation of this provision, for: "Under the name of a so-called
non-national appropriation, what was actually developed was technologi-
cal partition of the orbit, which is simply a national
appropriation .... ",128
The Bogota states tried to press their claims in inclusive arenas. Thus,
within the framework of UNCOPUOS, they presented the geostationary
orbit as a "limited national resource" of a sui generis character, in which
satellites could be placed only with the consent of the underlying
states. 12
9
Within the framework of the ITU, six of the eight original signatories
of the Bogota Declaration 130 and Gabon added a reservation to the Final
Acts of the 1977 WARC-BS stating that they were not bound by confer-
ence decisions regarding the location of satellites in segments of the orbit
over which they claimed sovereign rights. They reiterated their view that
use of such positions would require prior consent of the subjacent state,
and "reserved the right" to take steps to preserve and secure observance
of their rights.' 3 ' At the 1979 WARC, similar protocols were filed by
eight equatorial states. 132
The latest statements by representatives of the equatorial states, how-
ever, carefully avoid references to their national sovereignty over the geo-
stationary orbit and to the requisite of prior consent. They now seem to
favor inclusive planning of the resource, allowing for a regime of equita-
ble access to the orbit which should take into account the needs of the
developing countries and "the special interests of the equatorial na-
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id.
129. See Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Twentieth Session (16
Mar.-10 Apr. 1981), Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/
288, at 11 (1981).
130. Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire.
131. WARC-BS, supra note 92, Doc. 331-E. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 462.
132. Somalia joined the states listed supra, note 130. Indonesia filed a "separate, but sup-
portive" statement. C. CHRisroI, supra note 3, at 603 n.152.
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tions."133 This return to the fold of the Group of 77 was somewhat fore-
shadowed in paragraph 3a of the BogotA Declaration, which read:
The sovereign rights put forward by the equatorial countries are directed
towards rendering tangible benefits to their respective people and for the
universal community, which is completely different from the present reality
when the orbit is used to the greater benefit of the most developed
countries."
134
Claims to exclusive control over the geostationary orbit are thus for
the moment in abeyance, pending the creation of a more inclusive regime
for allocating orbital positions.
B. Claims to Unrestricted Use of the Geostationary Orbit
Highly developed countries are the predominant users of the geosta-
tionary orbit. Of the 74 communications satellites in this corridor at the
end of 1982, only 4 had been launched by or for developing countries.
135
At the time of the 1979 WARC, it was observed that 90 % of the radio
spectrum was controlled by countries with only 10 % of the world's pop-
ulation.136 These "space-resource states" 137 vigorously fought for the
133. Mr. Sunaryo (Indonesia), at a recent session of UNCOPUOS, stressed his govern-
ment's aim to develop:
the right planning methods and arrangements in the use of the geostationary orbit, ones
which would guarantee its fair and proper utilization ... .Since the geostationary orbit
has a sui generis character, the promulgation of legal norms regulating its use should not
fall under the regime of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and should take into account the
needs of the developing countries and the special interests of the equnatorial nations.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 15, at 58-60.
The Kenyan delegate put it this way:
This delegation cannot accept the status quo which bases the present use of the orbit on a
first-come-first-served basis. We are of the view that such regulation should take into
account not only the character of the resource, but also the fact that equatorial countries
have interests in the orbit.
Mr. Wabuge, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 15, at 22-25. Mr.
Rodriguez Medina, the representative of the host country to the Bogota meeting, referred to
the "urgent aspiration" by the "overwhelming majority.., of this Committee" to "legally
regulate and technologically plan the use of the geostationary orbit." He trusted that the
"technological Powers, in particular the United States, will lift their reservations on this issue
and play a full part in work on draft principles to fill one of the biggest gaps and play a full part
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty." Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note
25, at 18-20. His only reference to the equatorial countries was to their maintaining "for
almost 10 years, how only a few technological Powers enjoy monopolistic use of the orbital
resource, thanks to a defacto appropriation, based on the principle of first come, first served."
Id. at 21. See also Moyano, La Orbita Geoestacionaria y el Territorio del Estado, 249-251
REVISTA DE LA ACADEMIA COLOMBIANA DE JURISPRUDENCIA 48-68 (July-Dec. 1982).
134. Declaration of Bogoti, supra note 120, at 50.
135. Physical Nature, supra note 7, at 3. Since then, the two third-world space powers,
India and Indonesia, have each deployed a third satellite in geostationary orbit.
136. Hudson, Implications for Development Communications, 29 J. CoM. 179, 181 (1979).
See also Bortnick, International Information Flow: The Developing World Perspective, 14 COR-
NELL INT'L L. J. 333, 349 (1981).
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freedom of outer space, as applied to the geostationary orbit. They re-
jected the Bogoti claims 138 as well as inclusive regulation by UN-
COPUOS, there being, in the words of the U.S. delegate: "no practical
question concerning the geostationary orbit, which is clearly in outer
space, that can be answered or indeed appropriately addressed by the
development of new legal norms outside the ITU context."
139
Within the ITU context, the traditional approach to registration and
coordination of frequencies and orbital positions was favored over a
framework of comprehensive allotments of frequencies and orbital posi-
tions prior to their use. The U.S. position was stated prior to the 1979
WARC as follows:
The United States remains committed to the present system of flexible pro-
cedures, although we recognize that there is room for simplification and
improvement in the application of these procedures. We are generally op-
posed to prefixed allotment plans which distribute frequencies to individual
countries or regions without regard to present or demonstrated foreseeable
need.140
It was argued that the doctrine of prior notification had the advantages
of low cost and simplicity and required only minimal disclosure of infor-
mation.14 1 This a posteriori approach was also hailed as providing a flex-
ible framework on the basis of which states might seek suitable
accommodation, depending on needs at any given time.142 Trusting that
technological progress will allow expanded use of the orbit, developing
countries' fears were regarded by the highly developed states as un-
founded. The United States even sought "to provide reliable assurance
to all nations that they can obtain access to the spectrum as and when
their requirements develop."1 43 Thus, the United States preferred to
137. "The sphee-resource States have vigorously identified their preference for free and
equal exploration, use and exploitation of and free access to outer space." C. CHRisTOL, supra
note 3, at 457. Haanappel in 1978 expressly mentioned as states capable of putting satellites in
geostationary orbit only the United States, the U.S.S.R., Canada, France, and West Germany,
besides international organizations such as Intelsat and Intersputnik. Haanappel, Article 11 of
the Outer Space Treaty and the Status of the Geostationary Orbit, PROC. 21ST COLL. ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 28 n.5 (1979). This group has since expanded.
138. This is true for both the United States and the U.S.S.R. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note
3, at 456, 469.
139. Remarks of Mr. Sherman, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra
note 15, at 34-35.
140. U.S. Department of State, Reports Submitted to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979 (Public Law 95-426), submitted to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 89 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Reports).
141. Jackson, supra note 76, at 38.
142. C. CHRisToL, supra note 3, at 569-70. This system would "prevent the allotment of
such resources to prospective users unless there were a need for actual use." Id. at 570.
143. Reports, supra note 140, at 89.
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characterize its position as "everyone-come, everyone-served," rather
than "first-come, first-served." 144
A priori allotment of frequencies and orbital positions has been per-
ceived by the major present users as preventing optimum use of the orbit.
This system would leave many of the allotted frequencies and orbital po-
sitions unused, because less developed countries generally lacked facili-
ties, money, or the need to use them. 145 Furthermore, it was argued that
allotments to many small states would remove incentives to develop or-
bit/spectrum-conserving technologies'" and thus stifle technological
progress. 147 On the other hand, a priori planning systems would produce
congestion, 148 in particular on the parts of the orbit allotted to space-
resource powers. This proposal was labelled "wasteful, inefficient and
inequitable." 149 Finally, it was criticized for establishing permanent pri-
orities of use, contrary to Resolution Spa 2-1 of the 1971 WARC-ST.' 50
As its policy for the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference
on the Broadcasting-Satellite Service for the Americas (RARC-83), the
United States thus favored maximum flexibility. Specifically, the FCC's
RARC-83 Advisory Committee, "dominated by employees and associ-
ates of the major communication service providers,"' 151 advocated a
scheme referred to as "block allotment planning."152 A nation would be
granted one or more orbital slots, a "block" (i.e. a continuous position on
the frequency spectrum), and specified service areas. Specific channels
could be assigned later in domestic decision-making processes.1
5 3
In short, claims by highly developed countries to unrestricted use of
the geostationary orbit are beginning to give way to somewhat more in-
clusive schemes, but these countries continue to resist (at least verbally) a
comprehensive a priori allotment system.
C. Claims to Organized Inclusive Control Over the Geostationary Orbit
In the 1970s, outer space and telecommunications were drawn into the
144. Robinson, Regulating InternationalAirwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. I. INT'L L. 31
(1980). The author was the Chairman of the United States delegation to the 1979 WARC.
145. See T. McPHAIL, ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM 159 (1981). See also Gorove, supra
note 3, at 459-61.
146. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 581.
147. Bortnick, supra note 136, at 349.
148. C. CHRlSTOL, supra note 3, at 587.
149. Id. at 570.
150. Id. at 588.
151. Note, supra note 109, at 874.
152. RARC-83 Advisory Committee, Third Progress Report of Working Group 2B of
Subcommittee 2, at 2 (March 3, 1982), cited in Note, supra note 109, at 874.
153. Note, supra note 109, at 874-75.
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larger confrontation between the developed states and the Third
World. 154 This confrontation centered on the latter's claims for a "new
international economic order," 155 in which the world's descamisados
would receive a more equitable share of resources and greater power in
the global constitutive process.
The position of the Third World has been stated most clearly before
UNCOPUOS by the delegate of Vietnam, Mr. Le Kim Chung:
Viet Nam, a developing country, ardently hopes that achievements in space
science and technology will actively contribute, as they should, to the devel-
opment process of all peoples and to the establishment of a new interna-
tional economic order. We consider that, as in the case of the international
area of the sea-bed and its resources, the principle of common heritage of
mankind should be applied to outer space and its uses. If we consider the
issue from this approach, we would be entitled to ask for the exploration
and exploitation of outer space to be carried out for the benefit of all coun-
tries and all peoples, regardless of their levels of scientific and economic
development. It would also be appropriate to take measures to ensure ac-
cess for all countries, primarily the developing countries, free of discrimina-
tion or restrictions and in advantageous conditions, to the data provided by
154. Both terms are hopelessly imprecise. Objective classification of discrete territorial
communities is often difficult; self-selection is common practice and seems to yield better re-
sults. Finding of a collective identity among the countries of the Third World, in particular,
was precipitated by the common plight of underdevelopment and dependency. Politically, the
"South" emerged as an important center of gravity in international relations in the 1970's, in
part by pooling votes in the Group of 77 (now grown to over 100 members). The formative
document of the Group of 77 is the Charter of Algiers of October 24, 1967 (reprinted in 4 THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT 2415 (A. Mutharika ed. 1979). The term "Third
World" itself may be derived from the conception of a three-sector world economy, as devel-
oped by Raul Prebisch and Cesar Furtado in Latin America and Samir Amin in Africa. Ac-
cording to that view, the world economy is split into a core of advanced industrial states, a
semiperiphery of socialist countries, and a periphery of underdeveloped countries which are
mainly sources of raw materials. See S. AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE (1974);
Girvan, Economic Nationalism, 104 DAEDALUS 145 (1975).
155. The "new international economic order" is designed to bring about a redistribution of
values, in particular of wealth, power, and knowledge, in favor of developing countries. It was
first formally proclaimed at the 1973 Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers, and entered the interna-
tional limelight with the Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 715 (1974). The
Declaration stated, in a somewhat sweeping fashion, the right of all states which have been
under "foreign occupation, alien and colonial domination" to restitution and full compensa-
tion for the exploitation of, and damages to, their natural and other resources. Id., at para. 4f.
Other significant documents relating to this movement include the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, supra note 122, and the Algiers Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Peoples of July 4, 1976, reprinted in R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVER-
EIGNTY 225-28 (1981). See also Falk, The Algiers Declaration of the Rights of Peoples and the
Struggle for Human Rights, in id., at 185; LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Hossain ed. 1980); Galtung, The North/South Debate: Technology,
Basic Human Needs and the New International Economic Order, WORKING PAPER No. 12,
WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT (1980); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES (BRANDT COMMIssION), NORTH-SouTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SUR-
vIvAL (1980).
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all remote-sensing satellites and to all space technology in general. 156
References to the phrase "common heritage of mankind" essentially
mean claims to organized inclusive management of the resource so la-
belled. 157 This kind of regime has been sought, in particular, for the geos-
tationary orbit. The Philippine delegation to UNCOPUOS has stated its
support for: "the establishment of a legal regime for the geostationary
orbit that would recognize and safeguard its character as a common re-
source of mankind to be managed and used in an equitable manner for
the benefit of all States."
158
The clear implication was that the resource was to be used for the
benefit of developing states in particular, as the representatives of In-
dia,1 59 Syria, 16° and Egypt161 pointed out. That meant that a working
group within UNCOPUOS should be established that would: "deal not
solely with rules governing [the use of the geostationary orbit], as the
ITU has done, but also with drawing up norms and principles to make its
use more rational and fair." 162 The theme of fairness of use was ex-
panded by the Colombian delegate, who referred to "our mapa mundi of
under-development, which today, beset by financial penury, the spectre
of war and the growing marginalization of its economies, still nurtures
the hope that the immense wealth of cosmic resources can restore the
156. Remarks of Mr. Le Kim Chung, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 19, at 32-35. Outer space has also been proclaimed a "common heritage of man-
kind" in the Algiers Universal Declaration, supra note 155, art. 17 ("Every people has the
right to make use of the common heritage of mankind, such as the high seas, the sea-bed, and
outer space.")
157. For an example of the application of the concept to the sea-bed, see United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XI, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, at 51 (1982), re-
printed in 22 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 491, at 536 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Law of the Sea
Convention). For its application to the Moon, see Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of December 5, 1979, art. 11, G.A. Res. 34/68,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) (hereinafter
cited as Moon Treaty). For further analysis of the common heritage concept, see Wiessner &
Jung, Das v"lkerrechtliche Regime der geostationdren Umlaufbahn, 32 OSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 209, at 226-32 (1982).
158. Remarks of Mr. Garcia, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note
19, at 58-60.
159. The Indian representative stated that:
We are of the opinion that it is necessary to evolve some criteria and planning methods
and arrangements for the equitable and efficient use of the geostationary orbit and of the
radio-frequency spectrum. They should be based on the genuine needs identified by each
country and should take into account the specific needs of developing countries.
Remarks of Mr. Chandrashekar, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note
25, at 42.
160. Remarks of Mr. Kabakibo, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 247th
meeting supra note 31, at 46.
161. Remarks of Mr. Fathalla, id., at 48-50.
162. Remarks of Mr. Zarraga, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note
15, at 77 (representing Venezuela).
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battered and unjust balance of our earthly habitat."163
This aim of global redistribution was to be furthered by the establish-
ment of regional'" or universal 165 space agencies, and by both quantita-
tive and qualitative transfer of technology.1 66 The ultimate end was,
according to the delegate from Nigeria, "true self-reliance."
167
The main battleground in the struggle for law in this area, however,
has not been UNCOPUOS, but the ITU. Much of the criticism has been
directed against the doctrine of prior notification as encapsulated in the
slogan "first come, first served." This traditional approach, in the Third
World view, has essentially favored the highly industrialized states of the
West and the U.S.S.R.1 68 Developing states fear they might be denied
access to the geostationary orbit and associated frequencies once they
acquire the technology to use them.' 69 India, the non-aligned move-
ment's coordinating country on WARC 1979 satellite issues, had a par-
ticularly frustrating experience. In order to ensure a reasonable orbital
slot and appropriate frequencies for its national satellite INSAT 1-B, it
had to undergo a two-year long coordination procedure with a "rela-
tively inflexible" prior user, the U.S.S.R., 170 and ended up paying a
"fairly heavy penalty."1 71 The developing countries have concluded that
the traditional approach was not in their best interests. As India's chief
delegate noted at WARC 1979, developing countries "are the people who
seek access much later, whose resources are limited and who are in fact
163. Remarks of Mr. Rodriguez Medina, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 25, at 21.
164. Id., referring to a Chilean proposal for a Latin American Space Agency.
165. Remarks of Mr. Mehmud, id. at 58-60 (representing Pakistan). He thus reiterated a
proposal which dates back to the beginnings of space law and activities. See M. MCDoUGAL,
H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 1, at 872-97 1. For more recent discussions, see Should
There Be a World International Space Agency?, PROc. 20TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, at 15-46.
166. Remarks of Mr. Ayewab, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (247th
Meeting), supra note 31, at 36 (representing Nigeria). Interestingly, this claim was shared by
the delegate from Spain, Mr. Atienza. He stated a "duty incumbent upon the most-advanced
countries to pursue an urgent programme of technological transfer under favourable condi-
tions in order that the least-advanced countries can join on an equal footing the community of
countries engaged in remote sensing." Remarks of Mr. Atienza, Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, supra note 15, at 46.
167. Remarks of Mr. Ayewah, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (247th
Meeting), supra note 31, at 36.
168. T. MCPHAIL, supra note 145, at 152.
169. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 567.
170. Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 15.
171. Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks its Mind, SATELLITE COM.,
March 1980, at 23, cited in Rothblatt, supra note 64, at 15. Other countries that claim to have
encountered difficulties gaining access to desired orbital positions and frequencies include
France and Mexico. Focus on a Magnum Opus, 6 CHRON. INT'L CoM., March 1985, at 5, 6.
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not in a position to pay any penalties." 172
The solution preferred by most of these countries is allotment of fre-
quencies and orbital slots regardless of whether or not they have an im-
mediate use for them: a priori planning. Due consideration also should
be given to inequities in present distribution.
173
The theme of transfer of technology has surfaced as well. During
WARC 1979, the technologically advanced states were called on to de-
velop for Third World benefit broadcasts and reception of impulses on
single sideband receivers, as well as to provide "the technology, and the
capital investment to use it, free without patents, trade marks or license
fees." 174
For the first session of WARC-ORB in 1985, the proponents of a priori
planning, under the leadership of Algeria and the equatorial states, sug-
gested placing on the agenda the establishment of "principles, technical
parameters and criteria for the planning of the orbit and frequency as-
signments for space services. . taking into account relevant aspects of
the particular geographic situation of equatorial countries."' 175
III. Trends in Decision
The presence of both authority and control is essential to the concept
of law. 176 Authority, from a realist point of view, may be defined as the
"structure of expectation concerning who, with what qualifications and
mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by what criteria
and what procedures." 177 Control has been defined as effective power or
the condition of having an "effective voice in decision, whether author-
ized or not."'178 Given the decentralized structure of the world constitu-
tive process, decision-making competency essentially rests with
individual nation-states. In external affairs, they have set up common
structures to guide their actual conduct to the extent that international
intercourse, and thus self-interest in a world of increasing interdepen-
dence, requires foreseeability and reliability of behavior. On the most
172. Id.
173. McLeod, The World Takes on the Law of the Air, 83 NEW SCIENTIsT 878 (1979).
174. Raghavan, Everybody's Wave Length, 7 DEVELOPMENT FORUM 10 (1979).
175. Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the World Administrative
Radio Conference of the International Telecommunication Union, U.S. Department of State,
Office of International Communications Policy, TD Serial No. 116, at 75 (1979), cited in C.
CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 587.
176. Reisman, A Theory About Law from the Policy Perspective, LAW AND POLICY 75, 88-
89 (Weisstub ed. 1976).
177. McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1959).
178. Id.
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inclusive and general level, the United Nations has been created as such a
common structure, endowed with specific competences, i.e. authority.
Under and outside of the UN's umbrella, more specialized inclusive bod-
ies perform their tasks of coordinating states' policies on more specific
matters.
Control, the power to enforce decisions of inclusive bodies, however,
still rests essentially with the traditional actors of international law, the
nation-states. A state's stock of power, the impact of its voice in deci-
sion, varies widely, according to the base values at its disposal.179 Never-
theless, it is not only the "Big Powers" which can police the world.
Effective sanctioning does not always need the military instrument of a
"nuclear heavyweight."1 0 As the examples of the EEC, the Pacific Ba-
sin countries, and OPEC amply demonstrate, use of the economic instru-
ment may be at least equally successful. Moreover, the nuclear threat
may be totally ineffective in deterring "fanatics" from breaking the law.
Thus, all its values (power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, etc.) account for
a community's impact on the world constitutive process. This impact
may vary according to the problem at hand, and its assessment requires
the strenuous work of contextual analysis.
The main inclusive arenas of decision-making on the use of the geosta-
tionary orbit are the United Nations-in particular, the General Assem-
bly and its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space-and the
ITU. It is necessary to take stock of their authoritative decisions on the
issues at hand, starting with the activities of the UN.
A. The United Nations
The basic document, the "constitution" of outer space, is the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of
January 27, 1967 (1967 Treaty).181 Its main principles, as foreshadowed
in the leading treatise on outer space,' 8 2 have been accepted as evidence
of customary law on the subject.1
83
1
179. Almond, supra note 115, at 83.
180. Reisman, Chinese Fallout" Why We Can't Cry "Foul," THE NATION, Jan. 8, 1977, at
6-7.
181. Supra note 125.
182. [I]t would thus clearly appear that all the traditional, technical requirements have
been met for establishing a customary prescription that access to, and the use and enjoy-
ment of, outer space are the inclusive right of all peoples, on a basis of complete equal-
ity. . . . Any future unilateral challenge of this inclusive right we therefore conclude,
can be based, not on considerations of authority, but only on naked power. M. McDou-
GAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 1, at 227.
183. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 483; A. BUCKLING, DER WELTRAUMVERTRAG 81-82
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One of these leading principles, expressed in Article II, stipulates that
outer space "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." This
seemingly clear and unequivocal prescription would appear to allow im-
mediate dismissal of claims of sovereignty as raised in the Bogota Decla-
ration.18 4 However, equatorial states are right in pointing out that
neither this nor any subsequent treaty on outer space has defined its
scope of application ratione loci.185 Whether this implies, as they con-
clude, that the geostationary orbit is not subject to Article II, is a differ-
ent matter.
Since the beginning of the space age, there have been proposals to fix
the limit between airspace (where territorial sovereignty of the subjacent
state is recognized) and outer space (where exclusive control is outlawed)
at a discrete, unitary altitude. This spatial approach ran into difficulties
due to the variety of factors that were proposed for determining that
height. It has been said that there are "probably as many criteria as
there are speakers or writers on the subject .... ,186 The main reason
for the lack of consensus on the definition or delimitation of outer space
was the competition of a second, totally different approach which dis-
carded the very idea of a unitary boundary between the realms of inner
and outer space. This functional view proposed instead to focus on the
different kinds of activities in both areas, thus not foreclosing the pro-
gress of technology.18 7
In the United Nations, both spatialists and functionalists were present.
(1980). As of January 1, 1984, the treaty has been ratified by 89 states, including the United
States, the U.S.S.R., Canada, France, the two German states, India and the United Kingdom.
U.S. Dep't of State, TREATIES IN FORCE, January 1, 1984, at 288.
184. Brazil, Ecuador, and Uganda have ratified the 1967 Treaty; the other equatorial states
would be bound by customary prescription.
185. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 443.
186. Cheng, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem.
Functionalism versus Spatialism. The Major Premises, 5 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 323, 324
(1980). Proposals range from effective control, gravitational effect, actual or theoretical lowest
perigee of satellites, von Karman line, limits of air drag or air ffight, upper limits of the atmos-
phere and its various layers, to the prescriptions of the air conventions and absolutely arbitrary
heights. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSwELL & I. VLASiC, supra note 1, at 320-49. See also
Cheng, supra, at 324-25; A. GORBIEL, LEGAL STATUS OF OUTER SPACE (1980).
187. The main theoretical foundation for the functionalist approach was laid by Professors
McDougal and Lipson, who predicted that:
with growing awareness of the difficulties entailed by 'fixed lines' or putative horizontal
sheets and of the factors that do and should affect policy, the problem will transform itself
from one of boundaries to one of activities, in an appropriate pattern of reciprocities and
(potential) retaliations; and the now vexed questions of the legal 'status' of outer space
will be discarded for practical purposes, as the question of 'status' was discarded when
negotiations on the use of airspace came to the point of concrete agreement.
McDougal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 426
(1958). See also N. MATrE, AEROSPACE LAW 19 (1969).
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Whereas the latter originally had the support of both major space pow-
ers,188 the Soviet Union now has advanced a proposal that would estab-
lish the boundary between outer space and airspace "at an altitude not
exceeding 110 km above sea level. . . ."19 This proposal would set
maximum limits to airspace, but not foreclose conventional delimitation
of outer space at 96 kin, the lowest perigee of satellites achieved so far -
a test which has been advanced as authoritative for existing customary
law. 190 It would also allow rejection of the Bogota claims. However,
only the Federal Republic of Germany'91 and Belgium192 could be con-
vinced to switch sides; the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France still hold that there is no immediate need for delimitation of
boundaries. The functionalist view degenerated into a "wait-and-see"
approach. 193 Both the strength and weakness of UNCOPUOS lie in its
practice of proceeding by consensus. 194 As long as the two leading space
powers remain pitted against each other, this question will remain an
unresolved topic on the UNCOPUOS agenda, as it has been for more
than 20 years.' 95
Despite these differences, the international community has reacted
rather uniformly to the claims of sovereignty advanced by the equatorial
states. The United States rejected them first from a scientific point of
view,196 then by political fiat.197 Russian dismissals were also unequivo-
188. Cheng, supra note 186, at 324.
189. U.S.S.R. Working Paper, submitted to UNCOPUOS, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
L.139 (1983), reprinted in 1983 Report of Legal Sub-Committee, supra note 23, at 35. How-
ever, space objects should "retain the right of innocent (peaceful) passage over the territory of
other States at altitudes lower than the agreed boundary for the purpose of reaching orbit or
returning to earth." Id. Compare the ITU's definition of space station, supra note 97. See also
Butler, supra note 88, at 98.
190. Cheng, supra note 186, at 356. In 1974, the British Skynet-IIA had reached this
perigee. Id.
191. See Williams, The Problem of Demarcation is Back in the Limelight, PROc. 22ND
COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 245, 246 (1980); Zhukov, Delimitation of Outer Space,
PROC. 23RD COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 221 (1981).
192. Cheng, supra note 186, at 326.
193. Id. at 360; A. GORBIEL, supra note 186, at 12. For a recent U.S. statement, see the
remarks of Mr. Sherman, supra note 15, at 34-35.
194. Cheng, supra note 186, at 360. See also Christol, Telecommunications, Outer Space,
and the New International Information Order (NI), 8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 343, 348
(1981).
195. As early as 1959, the then Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
identified the issue of definition/delimitation of outer space and offered solutions on the basis
of both approaches. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 438.
196. The U.S. delegate to UNCOPUOS stated that the "gravitational phenomena" re-
ferred to in the Declaration of Bogota depended mainly on the total mass of the earth, not on
characteristics of its surface. He added, "If gravity were the exclusive force acting on a satel-
lite in geostationary orbit, the flight path of that satellite would be a vertical drop to the surface
of the Earth. We know, of course, that this is not what happens." DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1977, at 659.
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cal.198 Assertions of sovereignty over an area lying far beyond any con-
templated boundary of outer space met with protests from all over the
world, including virtually every international grouping1 99 except the
equatorial states themselves, who lack the power to enforce their. claims.
The position of the world community is best reflected in the statement of
the British delegate to UNCOPUOS:
As regards the geostationary orbit, I should like to reaffirm the view of the
United Kingdom that, whatever limits may ultimately be agreed upon for
outer space, there is no doubt that the geostationary orbit is inseparable
from outer space and is not subject to national sovereignty or
jurisdiction.
2°°
Thus, it may safely be concluded that the equatorial countries' claims to
exclusive control over the geostationary orbit are neither accepted nor
tolerated by the international community. Lacking both authority and
control, these states seem to have quietly put their claims to rest201 and
to have blended them into the more powerful and comprehensive bar-
gaining position of the Group of 77.202 The geostationary orbit remains
subject to outer space prescriptions, in particular the 1967 Treaty.
20 3
Article II of this treaty, however, not only prohibits appropriation by
197. 'The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over celestial
bodies, or any portion thereof. ..." White House Press Release of June 20, 1978, cited in C.
CHRsTOL, supra note 3, at 456 n.l 15. The United States also advised Colombia prior to the
Bogotfi Conference that its proposed action would violate international law. Id.
198. The Russian position was stated in this way:
The geostationary satellites' orbital space is inseparable from outer space as a whole
and all relevant provisions of the [1967 Treaty] are applicable to it, including, inter alia,
the provision that outer space is not subject to national appropriation by any means
whatsoever.
Draft Basic Provisions of the General Assembly Resolution on the Delimitation of Air Space
and Outer Space and on the Legal Status of the Geostationary Satellites' Orbital Space:
U.S.S.R. Working Paper, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N.Doc. A/AC.
105/L.112 (1979).
199. Rejections came from such diverse countries as Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Can-
ada, Czechoslovakia, France, the two German states, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and
Papua New Guinea. See Gorove, supra note 3, at 452; and C. CHRmSTOL, supra note 3, at 470-
71.
200. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (182nd mtg.), U.N. Doe. A/
AC.105/PV.182, at 7 (1978) (verbatim record).
201. A recent Colombian article refers to a "lost battle," See Albius, El Satilitey la Orbita
Geoestacionaria Una Batalla Perdida, NUEVA FRoNTERa., No. 382 (May 17, 1982).
202. See supra note 133.
203. Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime ofAir and Outer Space, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 576, 590 (1978); A. GORBIEL, supra note 186, at 53; Christol, supra note 108, at 36. UNIS-
PACE '82 produced this statement:
Despite lack of agreement on defining the precise boundary between air space and outer
space, it is accepted by most nations that GSO [Geostationary Satellite Orbit] is a part of
outer space and, as such, it is available for use by all States, in accordance with the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967.
Report on the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of
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claim of sovereignty, but also appropriation by means of use. Such for-
bidden activity has been denounced in the Bogota Declaration, as well,
which pointed to the crowding of the geostationary orbit by the leading
space powers and its effective "technological partition. ' ' 2°4 However, ex-
ploitation of geostationary orbital positions by occupancy was well
known and practised at the time the 1967 Treaty was drafted, and was
considered part of the "freedom of use and exploration" guaranteed by
Article I (2) of the treaty.20 5 Moreover, effective permanent appropria-
tion by occupation of the orbit is prevented by the limited lifetime of
satellites, the inability to maintain them absolutely fixed in a discrete or-
bital position, and the absence of intent to appropriate on the part of the
launching state.20 6 The charge of appropriation by placing satellites in
orbit thus seems untenable.
More serious consideration must be given to another interpretation of
Bogoti. The equatorial states see their claims to exclusive control as re-
taliatory measures for an alleged continuous breach by the space-re-
source powers of the "common interests rule, ' 20 7 the prime provision of
the 1967 Treaty: "The exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. ' 208
This paragraph, however, is immediately followed by a reference to
three freedoms of outer space: "Outer space. . . shall be free for explo-
ration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis
of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be
free access to all areas of celestial bodies. ' 20 9
It has been argued that the latter provision likens the public order of
outer space to that of the high seas. Ambassador Goldberg, U.S. repre-
sentative to the U.N. in 1967, commented before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations: "This was sort of a freedom-of-the-seas provi-
sion. '210 Professor Christol has concluded: "This observation indicated
Outer Space, U.N. Doe A/CONF.101/10, para. 281, at 70 (1982) (hereinafter cited as UNIS-
PACE Report).
204. Declaration of Bogoti, supra note 120. See also Haanappel, supra note 137, at 28.
205. In particular, the French delegate construed the term "use," as distinct from "explo-
ration," as equivalent to "exploitation," mentioning expressly the activities of weather and
communication satellites. C. CHRISrOL, supra note 3, at 39-40.
206. Id. at 548.
207. Markoff, The International Space Agency. Project, the Bogota Declaration and the
Common Interests Rule, PROc. 20TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 29, 37 (1978).
208. 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 125, art. I(1).
209. Id., art. 1(2).
210. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Treaty Hearings).
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that the negotiators were aware of the res communis concepts applying to
the ocean and were employing this analogy as they contemplated the
legal rules to be applied in the exploration and use, including exploita-
tion, of the space environment.
' '211
The res communis analogy, carrying with it unrestricted rights of use,
might be guided by the virtually limitless expanses of the voids of outer
space. Space, however, does not consist merely of voids. Even before the
1967 Treaty, there had been a marked tendency to more intense inclusive
control over this area than over the high seas. Referring to schemes of
direct international administration of outer space, Professors McDougal,
Lasswell and Vlasic stated as early as 1963 that:
[T]hese varying ambitious arrangements concerning organized inclusive
competence could not be seriously discussed if there were not a universally
shared conviction that space already is a common domain of the whole
mankind, belonging in equal measure to all under shared competence. Sug-
gestions so comprehensive have never been made even with respect to the
maritime domain, which is considered by many as a model arrangement for
the emerging public order of outer space.212
This conviction has found its way into the leading provisions of the 1967
Treaty. In contrast to Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas213 as basically retained in Article 87 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, 214 there is no general "freedom of outer space," no inter
alia clause to downgrade the three specific freedoms mentioned to mere
examples of the states' unrestricted right to use the common resource.
Article I (2) of the 1967 Treaty lists these three freedoms as the ones of
exploration, use and access to outer space. These three enumerated liber-
ties are qualified immediately, as freedoms to be used "by all States with-
out discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
with international law."
'215
Above all, the 1967 Treaty mandates that space use and exploration
shall be carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries. ' 216 The U.S. Department of State has expressed the view that this
provision did "not create legal obligations with respect to the terms of
The perhaps intentional imprecision of the statement is evident in the use of the phrase "sort
of."
211. C. CHRIsTOL, supra note 3, at 45.
212. M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIc, supra note 1, at 243.
213. Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
214. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 157, art. 87.
215. 1967 Treaty, supra note 125, art. 1(2).
216. Id., art. I(1).
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international cooperation on any existing or future space projects. '217
To play it safe, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations attached an
"understanding" to its advice and consent to ratification, which stated
that "nothing in Article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty diminishes or alters
the right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits arid
results of its space activities. ' 218 With this formula, at least an obligation
to share, however imperfect, seems to have been recognized.
In addition the phrase "province of all mankind" indicates a move
toward shared inclusive competence. It has been praised for making
mankind a subject of international law and providing the starting point
for detailed inclusive regulation of resources under the label of "common
heritage of mankind." Embryonic, or of broad constitutional generality,
the phrase did not carry with it a framework of direct international ad-
ministration of outer space, the characteristic feature of the "common
heritage" concept.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the 1967 Treaty does not
provide for unrestricted use and exploitation of the area.219 It is, how-
ever, impossible to determine the exact limitations to individual states'
activities without getting lost in a quagmire of controversies.
In any event, common interests do not seem to be best served by cast-
ing the whole variety of resources assembled in outer space into the Pro-
crustean bed of one legal regime. The flow resource of the voids of outer
space is, at least technologically, infinite and inexhaustible; thus space-
flight would probably yield the greatest benefits for mankind if individual
states could perform this activity free of restrictions, subject only to as-
tronautical rules of the road.
This situation may differ with regard to stock resources, for example,
precious metals and minerals on the moon and other celestial bodies. On
December 5, 1979, an Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies220 was signed, according to which
the "moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of man-
kind" to be developed and managed under an "international regime"
providing for an "equitable sharing" by all states in the benefits derived
from these resources.221 This treaty, though not applicable to the geo-
217. Treaty Hearings, supra note 210, at 53.
218. S. ExEc. REP. No. 8, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
219. Marcoff, La LibertJ de L'espace-R$gle de Droit International d Condition
Risolutoire, 28 ZErscHRIFr FOR LuFr-TND WELTRAUMRECHT 405, 411 (1979).
220. Moon Treaty, supra note 157.
221. Id., art. 11.
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stationary orbit22 2 and suffering from a damaging lack of adherence, 223 at
least demonstrates the necessity of tailoring special regimes for suffi-
ciently different resources according to their nature and the types of their
use. Just as the public order of the deep seabed or the continental shelf
has been divorced from the general regime of the high seas, the public
order of the geostationary orbit must be constructed according to the
specific parameters of this resource.
The issue of the geostationary orbit has been on the agenda of UN-
COPUOS for more than a decade. Although it largely left the issue for
consideration and regulation by the ITU, UNCOPUOS organized, in
1982, the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE '82). In its final report, this
conference provided some guidance with respect to future trends in deci-
sion relating to the geostationary orbit:
277. GSO [geostationary orbit] is a unique natural resource of vital im-
portance to a variety of space applications. . . Though not depletable,
GSO is a limited natural resource. Therefore, as with any limited re-
source, . . its optimal utilization requires co-ordination, planning and/or
arrangements ....
281. . . . Given the limited nature of the resource, efficiency of use is cer-
tainly important and any plan and/or other arrangement that is formulated
must encourage greater efficiency. However, efficiency of GSO and RF [ra-
dio frequency] spectrum usage should not be a barrier to attempts at tech-
nological self-reliance, consistent with the provisions of international
regulations....
282. Efficiency of use cannot be an end in itself: it is only a means of
ensuring all countries equitable access to this scarce resource. In particular,
there are many developing countries which do not now have either the re-
sources or the need to use GSO but are likely to do so in the future. Any
planning method and/or arrangement that is evolved should recognize and
accommodate the future needs of developing countries and should not re-
sult in unnecessar[il]y hastening their plans to the detriment of their finan-
cial and self-reliance interests....
288. In conclusion, considering the long-term implications of the growing
activities in GSO, any solution on the use of GSO should be both equitable
and flexible and take into consideration the economic, technical and legal
aspects. 22
4
222. See remarks of Kolossov, PRoc. 23RD COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 225
(1981).
223. In accordance with Article 19(3), the Moon Treaty entered into force on July 11,
1984, following ratification by Austria (instrument of ratification deposited with the Secretary-
General, June 11, 1984). UN J. No. 84/112 (June 12, 1984) at 5. The treaty has been ratified
by only four other states: the Philippines (May 26, 1981), Uruguay (Nov. 9, 1981), Chile
(Nov. 12, 1981), and the Netherlands (Feb. 17, 1983). M. BOWMAN & D. HARRis, MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS (1984) at 447.
224. UNISPACE Report, supra note 203, at 69-71. Following up on UNISPACE '82
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Although far from providing any further detail, the basic community
policies on the public order of the geostationary orbit have been identi-
fied: equitable access and efficiency of use. We will meet them again.
B. The ITU
One element of the twin resource of the geostationary orbit has always
been at the heart of the mandate of the ITU: the radio-frequency spec-
trum. The other, satellites' orbital positions, was added to the ITU's
mandate in 1973.225 At the same Plenipotentiary Conference of Malaga-
Torremolinos, the fundamental policy underlying this extension of the
mandate was formulated:
In using frequency bands for space radio services Members shall bear in
mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited
natural resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically so
that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in
conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations according to their
needs and the technical facilities at their disposal.
22 6
This provision of the International Telecommunication Convention, the
constitutive document of the ITU, was rephrased at the 1982 Plenipoten-
tiary Conference of Nairobi, to change the concluding portion to "taking
into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geo-
graphical situation of particular countries. '227
While the world community has come to agree upon the principle of
equitable access to the geostationary orbit and space communication fre-
quencies, the meaning of equity in this context is far from clear. The
recommendations, UNCOPUOS proposed studies on:
(a) Assistance to countries in studying their remote sensing needs and assessing appro-
priate systems for meeting such-needs ...
(b) The feasibility of using direct broadcasting satellites for educational purposes and of
internationally or regionally-owned space segments ...
(c) The feasibility of obtaining closer spacing of satellites in the geostationary orbit and
their satisfactory co-existence, including a closer examination of techno-economic impli-
cations, particularly for developing countries, in order to ensure the most effective utiliza-
tion of this orbit in the interest of all countries ...
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 2, at 6.
225. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
226. ITC, supra note 66, art. 33(2). In addition to its new assignment to record orbital
positions under Article 10(3)(b) of the ITC, the IFRB was also empowered to "furnish advice
to Members. . .with a view to the equitable, effective and economical use of the geostation-
ary-satellite orbit." Id., art. 10(3)(c). The IFRB thus moved from an essentially ministerial to
a policy-making role.
227. For the authoritative French text, see 164 TRACTATENBLAD VAN HET KONINKRUK
DER NEDERLANDEN (1983), at 20. For this translation, see Note, supra note 109, at 863.
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concept of equity has been a topic of enduring philosophic inquiry and
controversy.228 Unfortunately, it is not possible simply to defer to phi-
losophers for guidance. Nor does reference to the concept of equality
clarify the meaning of equity, since equality, too, is used in very different
ways (e.g., equality of rights, of opportunities, of conditions, or of
outcomes).
229
It is not philosophical constructs, however well-conceived, that deter-
mine the outcome of decision-making processes. Rather, the outcome of
decision-making processes is affected primarily by the context of the spe-
cific problem at hand, its microcosm of facts, claims, past trends in deci-
sions, and the base values at the disposal of the rival claimants. One may
then agree with Gustav Radbruch's definition of equity as "individual-
ized justice," in the sense of justice as applied to an individual case.
230
Use of the term equity in the inclusive decision-making processes on
access to the geostationary orbit had, first and foremost, a negative mean-
ing: the time-honored claim of "first-come, first-served" was "generally
disavowed."' 231 A regime guided by equity would have to be construed
so as to prevent a situation in which technological latecomers would have
no access to the resource. This latter meaning of equity has developed
over time.
Whereas in the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference version, actual need
and technical capacities were decisive, the 1982 text leaves these special
interests of space-resource powers at the periphery. They are replaced by
predominant concern for the special needs of developing countries, mark-
ing another milestone in the Third World's long march to substantive
equality in international relations.
The latter part of the new conclusion, referring to the "geographic sit-
uation of particular countries," is rather controversial. Whereas equato-
rial states hail it as a kind of limited recognition of their claims, the
228. The concept of equity has often been associated with the idea of distributive justice.
But, the criteria of distribution differ. For example, Aristotle, under the formula of "to each
his due," essentially favored the idea of "proportionate equality" giving each person what he
"deserves." NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, 3. Marx, under the battle-cry "to each accord-
ing to his needs," sought substantive equality that determined each individual's needs objec-
tively, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (Int'l Publ. ed. 1938). See also J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195 (1971) (concept of equal liberty derived from a fusion of the con-
cepts of liberal equality and democratic equality).
229. 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 6-7 (1977). The International
Court of Justice has noted that "[e]quity does not necessarily imply equality," for "[t]here can
never be any question of completely refashioning nature." North Sea Continental Shelf Case,
1969 I.C.J. 12, 49 (Judgment, Feb. 20, 1969).
230. G. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 127 (E. Wolf 4th ed. 1950) (author's
translation).
231. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 561.
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highly industrialized countries interpret it to refer to polar and certain
tropical and desert countries where geographical and climatic conditions
affect signals from satellites. The same formula was used in Resolution
BP of WARC 1979.232 The Resolution accepted the formula in stating
the mandate of the 198j-88 WARC-ORB over the Algerian-equatorial
proposal, which had referred to the "particular geographic situation of
equatorial countries. ' 233 Though this history of the formula suggests the
correctness of the industrialized countries' interpretation, submission of
the respective understandings in the form of interpretative notes in the
process of ratification might be advisable.
The drive for equity led to the planning (i.e. a priori allotment of fre-
quencies and orbital positions) of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service. It is
now, after SAT-83, completed for all segments of the geostationary orbi-
tal belt. Highly industrialized states, in particular the United States,
have perceived it to be in their best interests to accommodate themselves
to allotment plans. In Region 2 (the Americas), for example, no blocks
of frequencies were allotted, only a high number of very precisely deter-
mined channels and orbital locations.234
Planning of this sort is confined at present to the Broadcasting-Satellite
Service. The space-resource states at WARC 1979 successfully blocked
attempts by developing countries to turn the 1985-88 WARC-ORB into a
forum extending this particular planning approach to the entire orbit.235
The first session of WARC-ORB, according to Resolution BP, will have
to decide "which space services and frequencies should be planned."
This resolution, titled "Relating to the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite
Orbit and to the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing it," provides, in
its operative part:
1. that a world space administrative radio conference shall be convened
not later than 1984 to guarantee in practice for all countries equitable
access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the frequency bands allo-
cated to space services;
2. that this conference shall be held in two sessions;
3. that the first session shall
3.1. decide which space services and frequencies should be planned;
3.2. establish the principles, technical parameters and criteria for
the planning, including those for orbit and frequency assign-
ments of the space services and frequency bands identified as
per paragraph 3.1, taking into account the relevant technical
232. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution BP, at 744.
233. See C. CHRisTOL, supra note 3, at 587.
234. See SAT-83, supra note 45.
235. C. CHRiSTOL, supra note 3, at 586-87.
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aspects concerning the special geographical situation of partic-
ular countries; and provide guidelines for associated regulatory
procedures;
3.3. establish guidelines for regulatory procedures in respect of
services and frequency bands not covered by 3.2;
3.4. consider other possible approaches that could meet the objec-
tive of resolves 1... 236
WARC-ORB is expected to focus initially on the Fixed-Satellite Ser-
vice,2 37 a category including telephone, telex, data, and teleconferencing
communications.2 38 However, its mandate is broad enough to include
discussions of the principles of a general regime of the geostationary
orbit.
The conference will have to start from established basic community
policies of equitable access to, as well as efficient and economic use of the
geostationary orbit. However, there is another recurring theme, a leitmo-
tiv of all the conferences of the 70's: assignments of frequencies and orbi-
tal positions should not give rise to permanent priorities. It was first
phrased in Resolution Spa 2-1 of the 1971 WARC-ST, titled "Relating to
the Use by All Countries, with Equal Rights, of Frequency Bands for
Space Radiocommunication Services," which provided:
1. that the registration with the I.T.U. of frequency assignments for space
radiocommunication services and their use should not provide any per-
manent priority for any individual country or groups of countries and
should not create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by
other countries;
2. that, accordingly, a country or a group of countries having registered
with the I.T.U. frequencies for their space radiocommunication serv-
ices should take all practicable measures to realize the possibility of the
use of new space systems by other countries or groups of countries so
desiring;
3. that the provisions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Resolution
should be taken into account by the administrations and the permanent
organs of the Union.
2 39
At WARC 1979, the same text (except for the replacement of refer-
ences to ITU with IFRB) was adopted as Resolution AY.24° Ironically,
236. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution BP, at 744-45.
237. U.S. Dep't of State, Office of International Communications Policy, United States
National Program for the ITU's World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of Geos-
tationary Satellite Orbit and Space Services 1985/1987, at 2 (1982) cited in Note, supra note
109, at 877. The Fixed-Satellite Service is used for point-to-point communication. See WARC
1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 22, at 33.
238. Note, supra note 109, at 870.
239. WARC-ST, supra note 85, Resolution Spa 2-1.
240. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution AY, at 743-44.
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its main proponents had changed. Whereas, in 1971, the Third World
used it to combat the "first-come, first-served" system,241 at WARC
1979, the delegate from the United States worried about allotment plans
giving rise to permanent priorities.242 A common fear seems to have
been a geostationary orbit chopped up into tiny exclaves, fragments of
sovereignty. The ITU stresses that its assignments do not constitute "ap-
propriations; ' 243 its Radio Regulations are introduced by the statement
that it does not, in fulfilling its duties, express any opinions about the
status of geographical areas.244 Such endeavors would, in any event, be
ultra vires. Within the purview of the ITU mandate, however, is the full
range of inclusive control established until now over the two composite
resources of the geostationary orbit, satellite positions and space commu-
nication frequencies. If resolutions against permanent priorities are to
have any meaning, they will have to lead to some sort of inclusive control
over the period of validity of assignments with respect to both resources.
A first step in this direction has been Resolution BY of WARC 1979,
titled "Relating to the Period of Validity of Frequency Assignments to
Space Stations Using the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit." According to
the resolution, from July 1, 1980 until WARC-ORB,
a frequency assignment to a space station on a geostationary satellite shall
be deemed definitively discontinued after the expiry of the period of opera-
tion shown on the assignment notice, reckoned from the date on which the
assignment was brought into service. This period shall be limited to that
for which the satellite network was designed. 245
However,
if a notifying administration which wishes to extend the period of operation
originally shown on the assignment notice of a frequency assignment of an
existing space station informs the Board accordingly more than three years
before the expiry of the period in question and if all other basic characteris-
tics of that assignment remain unchanged, the Board shall amend as re-
quested the period of operation .... 246
To make it perfectly clear, a footnote to the text explains: "The expres-
sion 'space station' may apply to more than one satellite provided that
only one satellite is in operation at any particular moment and that the
stations installed on board successive satellites have identical basic
241. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 150.
243. Butler, supra note 88, at 98.
244. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Radio Regulations no. 1, at 31.
245. WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution BY, at 746 (footnote omitted).
246. Id. (footnote omitted).
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characteristics." 247
Indefinite prolongations of assignments are thus allowed, provided
that the nature and degree of use do not change. The initial determina-
tion of periods of validity is still subject to exclusive control. This sys-
tem, however, is only an experimental procedure. The resolution itself
stresses "that the application of this Resolution shall not prejudge in any
way the decisions of the space administrative radio conference referred to
in Resolution 3 [i.e. Res. BP]." 248
The common thread linking all these endeavors is a striving for flexi-
bility. Its importance will increase dramatically when large space struc-
tures are set up, requiring relocation of a great number of existing space
objects.249 Any public order of the geostationary orbit will have to take
that factor into account.
A final theme permeating these conferences is a kind of "soft" transfer
of technology in favor of developing countries by establishing bilateral
and multilateral technical assistance programs, training indigenous staff
with the help of scholarships in space-resource states, setting up space
information centers at an inclusive level, holding seminars, and advising
individual countries on speciffc space application systems tailored to their
needs.2 0 All these activities are geared towards effective participation of
technologically less advanced states in the use of outer space.
The four pillars on which the public order of the geostationary order
must be built have now been identified: equitable access, efficiency, econ-
omy, and flexibility. Guidance to effective decision-making should strive
247. Id. n.1.
248. Id. at 747.
249. This relocation will be necessary because of the shadowing effects of large space ob-
jects. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
250. See WARC 1979, supra note 2, Resolution DG, at 763 ("Relating to the Transfer of
Technology"); id., Resolution CZ, at 764 ("Relating to International Cooperation and Techni-
cal Assistance in the Field of Space Radiocommunications"); id., Resolution CX, at 765 ("Re-
lating to the Role of Telecommunications in Integrated Rural Development"). Establishment
of an "International Space Information Service" has been proposed for 1984. See Report of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 2, at 5-6. There already exists
a very active U.N. Programme on Space Applications. Id. at 4-5. The Programme co-spon-
sors international training seminars on space research and remote sensing applications, with
WMO, FAO, UNESCO and the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of
Scientific Unions. Both the space information system and the expanded U.N. Space Applica-
tions Programme result from UNISPACE '82 recommendations, and are to be supported by
voluntary contributions. Remarks of Mr. Jankowitsch, Chairman of UNCOPUOS, Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, (245th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.245, at 17
(1983) (verbatim record). Further meritorious work is done by the International Astronautical
Federation, in particular, which is preparing an annual report on the development of space
technology. Remarks of Mr. Chevalier, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra
note 25, at 28.
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to accommodate all of them with a view towards maximizing benefits for
the entire global community.
Various regimes to regulate the orbit have been proposed, but as yet no
comprehensive authoritative decisions have been made. Legal regulation
of other resources is part of our heritage. Making use of that abundant
stock of experience, it is possible to explore model regulatory regimes,
with a view to devising one that will best fulfill the basic community
policies outlined above.
IV. Model Regimes
Blueprints for the future can but gain from lessons of the past. Man-
kind has faced problems of resource allocation and control ever since
there was some sort of organized coexistence. Decisions have been made,
and pertinent sets of prescriptions have been refined and diversified, es-
sentially shaped alongside the parameters of the nature and type of the
resource and the possibilities of its use, taking into account basic commu-
nity policies. In some communities, these prescriptions have found their
way into written law. A classic example is Justinian's codification of the
Roman "law of things."
Up to the present day, publicists refer to res nullus or res communis in
order to describe certain allocations of competence and possibilities of
the use of resources under international law. This is not only due to the
fact that Latin has been the academic lingua franca for centuries. The
universalist self-perception of the late Roman Empire251 lent itself and its
regulations of "internal" behavior to the conceptualization and formula-
tion of policies for the scattered and deeply divided, but nevertheless ba-
sically interdependent, universe of today. The Digest still provides us
with a general framework of resource regimes, models, which are func-
tionally identical with the oldest and most novel allocations of control
under modern international law. In Justinian's main classification, 252
these regimes are expressed by the concepts of res in patrimonio, res nul-
lius, res communis, and res publica. These general models and their es-
sential features are presented to place the search for a public order of the
geostationary orbit into the contexts of past experience, and to develop a
general regime which would be most in concordance with both the na-
251. The Roman Empire in its latter days approached universality in self-perception, and
the notion of Roman citizenship lost its content as the jus gentium was applied uniformly
throughout the realm. See R. MACIvER, THE MODERN STATE 107 (1926).
252. See W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTIN-
IAN 182-186 (Stein 3rd ed. 1966); J. THOMAS, TEXTaOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1976); P. VAN
WARmELO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN CIVIL LAW (1976); F.
SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW (1951).
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ture and uses of the resource at hand and the basic community policies as
identified above.
A. Res in patrimonio
In classical Roman law, these are resources belonging to someone, that
is, under a person's exclusive control. In international law, this someone
is usually a nation-state. Typically, these resources include the land
masses and contiguous areas such as airspace and inland waters, and, to
a lesser degree, the territorial sea. They are subject to exclusive appropri-
ation by the nation-states, and, through internal processes of allocation,
are often made available to exclusive appropriation by individuals. The
key notions that express these exclusive claims are, on the internal level,
property, and, in the external arena, sovereignty. 253 The most significant
difference between the land masses and other spatial-extension resources
is that the land masses are relatively solid. This quality facilitated estab-
lishment of permanent sedentary communities with exclusive claims.
Also, land masses feature many natural barriers which reinforce the pa-
rochial nature of social organization.
25 4
The nature and type of the geostationary orbital resource do not favor
claims of exclusive control. There is no contiguity with land masses and
other classic exclusive resources. The spectrum cannot be brought under
any actor's effective control. The positions of satellites are not stable,
and increasingly drift after the depletion of their energy resources. Also,
basic community policies crystallized in established trends in decision
(e.g., Article II of the 1967 Treaty) oppose claims to exclusive control
over any part of outer space. Thus, this model cannot be a general
framework for the public order of the geostationary orbit.
B. Res nullius
These are things belonging to no one. In contrast to the more encom-
passing notion in Roman law,255 they can, under international law, be
effectively occupied 256 and added to the exclusive domain of individual
253. See M. ARSANJANI, supra note 118, at 54.
254. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsIc, supra note 1, at 803-06.
255. Res nullius were further subdivided into res nuiius divinijuris and res nullius humani
juris. The former, including churches, tombs, and burial grounds, could not be dealt with
commercially, whereas the latter, including wild animals and abandoned property, could be
acquired under some circumstances. See W. BUCKLAND, supra note 252, at 183-84.
256. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 1, at 844-67; 1 OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 555 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS 163 (6th ed. 1963). Discovery and symbolic acts alone were held to have failed to
establish exclusive appropriation in the Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 829 (1928); Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J.
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nation-states. The concept was of great importance in the age of coloni-
alism. Today, the sole examples of res nullius territories are newborn
islands and perhaps Antarctica. 25 7 As to the latter, no less than seven
states asserted claims to exclusive control over segments of it. In 1959,
the Antarctica Treaty, concluded by these seven and five other major
powers, effectively froze these claims258 until at least 1993, when a new
treaty will have to establish a more permanent public order for this vast
polar region. With the establishment of permanent bases and activities in
the area by the claimants, Antarctica seems to have lost its character as
res nullius.259 Trends in decision are clearly toward shared inclusive
control.260
For the geostationary orbit, occupation could not be a way to establish
exclusive control. Satellites, even at the peak of their activities, cannot be
maintained absolutely fixed at one point above the earth. Occupied parts
of the spectrum could always be subject to interference. Indeed, as noted
above, exclusive appropriation is outlawed by the international commu-
nity. Res nuiius cannot therefore be a model for the geostationary orbit.
C. Res communis
A resource so-labelled is basically open to everyone without a license
and free of charge. Under Roman law, it included the air, the sea, and
the seashore to the highest winter floods. 261 Under traditional interna-
tional law, as set forth in the 17th century,262 the paradigm of res com-
munis was the high seas. As the outcome of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea seems to portend, however, creeping
coastal-state jurisdiction (via proclamation of continental shelves, exten-
INT'L L. 390 (1932). See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 1, at
830-44.
257. See Hayton, The Nations and Antarctica, I00 STERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
6FFENTLICHES RECHT 368, 390 (1960). See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 37,
at 482-83.
258. Antarctica Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71, art. IV (1959).
See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsIc, supra note 1, at 798-801.
259. Hayton, supra note 257, at 390..
260. The exclusiveness of the "Antarctica Club" is now less acceptable to other states.
Moreover, Recommendation XI-1 of the Antarctic Consultative Parties now stresses the inter-
ests of all mankind in Antarctica. See Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 43 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT
312, 313 n.4 (1983). According to the preamble to the Antarctica Treaty, it was "in the inter-
est of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes. . . ." Antarctica Treaty, supra note 258, preamble.
261. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 252, at 182-83; Nunes, Sources of Public Streams in Mod-
ern South African Law, 1975 ACTA JURIDICA 298, 299 (1976); See INSTITUTES 2.1.1 and DI-
GEST 1.8.2.1.
262. See GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1633) ch. 1 (trans. Magoffin 1916).
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sions of the territorial seas, and establishment of contiguous and exclu-
sive economic zones) is leading to a virtual "terranization 263 of the sea.
In terms of legal art, res communes were regarded as things of com-
mon enjoyment, available to all living persons by virtue of their exist-
ence. Utilization of the resource was thus an incident of personality, not
of property.264 The reason for denying any exclusive rights to resources
so classifi I was their perceived inexhaustibility.265 The waters of the
oceans, for example, are vast and seemingly limitless in quantity.
Although the twin resources of the geostationary orbit cannot be ex-
hausted, they can be used only by a finite number of claimants at a given
time. They are definitely limited in quantity, and legal regulation of ac-
cess is necessary to prevent disturbances of minimum world public order
from conflicting claims. One such regulatory principle under a res com-
munis regime would be priority of use. However, in a situation of acute
scarcity, it would deprive latecomers of access to a resource which is
generally utilized on a long-term basis or subject them to a fairly heavy
penalty, as the Indian example demonstrates. 266 Basic community poli-
cies and trends in decision have disavowed this "first-come, first-served"
maxim, the traditional rule of international communications law, in favor
of the formula of "equitable access. '267 This principle goes beyond the
res communis idea, and likens the public order of the geostationary orbit
to the last main category of Roman property law, res publica.
D. Res publica
Publicists have hailed the principle of the "common heritage of man-
kind" as a novel concept, reflecting the Zeitgeist of our time. However,
this concept is novel neither in designation nor in content.
As early as 1909, a common law court referred to that term with broad
meaning.268 Its content is strongly reminiscent of res publica, the last
and often overlooked category of the Roman law of things. Res publicae
comprised public roads, bridges, ports, fora, theaters, baths and flowing
263. Graf Vitzthum, Terranisation ofthe Ocean: The Tendency Towards a Maritime Law
Centered on Raw Materials, 15 LAW AND STATE 124 (1977); Graf Vitzthum, supra note 117,
at 314 n.25.
264. J. THOMAS, supra note 252, at 129.
265. Nunes notes that res communes "were regarded as inexhaustible and sufficient for
everyone; thus there was no reason for anyone to own a res communis. Not even the State
could appropriate it." Nunes, supra note 261, at 299.
266. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
268. Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909) ("Light and air are as much a
necessity as water and all are the common heritage of mankind.").
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rivers.269 They were regarded as the property of the Roman people. 270
The common denominator was that they were limited in nature and, at
the same time, heavily used. Many competing claims to access and utili-
zation led to extensive regulation by the state.271
Scarcity, and sometimes non-renewability, have also been critical fac-
tors in labelling a resource part of the "common heritage of mankind."
The paradigm has been the deep sea-bed where a scramble for the riches
of the ocean floor has been deemed contrary to the common interest, 272
and a regime of equitable sharing under direct international administra-
tion has been established by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 273
Other resources to which application of the common heritage concept
has been at least proposed are the moon,274 technology, 275 and "cultural
heritage. ' 276 Embryonic forms of the concept are to be found in the 1967
Treaty277 and the 1959 Antarctica Treaty.278
The main characteristic of the common heritage regime is equitable
sharing of the resource concerned under inclusive administration. Other
features include non-appropriation, demilitarization, freedom of scientific
research, and protection of the resource.279 Equitable sharing of re-
sources beyond one state's exclusive control is an established concept in
269. J. THOMAS, supra note 252, at 129. Rivulets were privately owned. See W. BUCK-
LAND, supra note 252, at 183 n.4.
270. J. THOMAS, supra note 252, at 129; F. SCHULZ, supra note 252, at 340; see DIGEST
50.16.15.
271. Heavy use could change the public order of a resource. Flowing water, for example,
was originally treated as a res communis but ended up as a res publica due to increasing use.
Nunes, supra note 261, at 300-01.
272. See the statement by President Johnson on July 16, 1966:
...under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich har-
vests and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the mari-
time nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the
high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and ocean bottoms are, and remain, the
legacy of all human beings.
II L.B. JOHNSON, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1966) 722, 724.
273. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 157, part XI.
274. Moon Treaty, supra note 157, art. 11(1).
275. See Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, preamble,
para. 2, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/9 annex II, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 462 (1978):
"Believing that technology is part of universal human heritage and that all countries have the
right of access to technology, in order to improve the standards of living of their
peoples .. "
276. See Goy, The International Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage, 4
NETHERLANDS YB. INT'L L. 117 (1973).
277. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 260 and accompanying text and Note, Thaw in International Law?
Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804 (1978).
279. See Kewenig, Common Heritage of Mankind-politischer Slogan oder vwlker-
rechtlicher Schlisselbegriffl? in STAATSRECHT VL6LKERRECHT EUROPARECHT, 385, 388-91
(Miinch ed. 1981); Wiessner & Jung, supra note 157, at 226.
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international law.280 It is the principle underlying international regimes
of rivers and lakes281 or transfrontier flow resources like oil and gas de-
posits. 282 What is new is resource management on behalf of mankind as
a whole, just as the Roman Empire acted on behalf of the Roman people.
Property283 owned by the most comprehensive community conceivable is
the common denominator of res publica and the common heritage of
mankind. For purposes of international law, the consequences were
stated as early as 1968 by Ambassador Pardo: "[T]he notion of property
that cannot be divided without the consent of all and which should be
administered in the interests and for the benefit of all is also a logical
extension of the common heritage concept."
284
The practical result of the concept has been the establishment of an
International Sea-Bed Authority that acts on behalf of mankind as a
whole.285 The authority has a managerial arm, the Enterprise, which is
supposed to extract minerals and to transport, process, and market
them.28 6 Under the new Law of the Sea Convention, authoritative deci-
sion-making has largely been taken away from individual nation-states-
a factor which did not make powerful and technologically advanced
communities glowing adherents of the idea. Further, these countries did
not feel they were adequately represented in the Sea-Bed Authority.287
Seeing the need, however, for coordinating exploitation of the ocean
floor, they concluded among themselves a so-called mini-treaty providing
reciprocal recognition of national licenses issued under unilateral deep
sea-bed mining acts.288 Whatever the outcome of this battle over the
280. Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects), 162
RECUEIL DES CouPs 253 (1979); Handl, .The Principle of "Equitable Use" as Applied to Inter-
nationally Shared Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes
over Transfrontier Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROrr INT'L 41 (1978-79).
281. See Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BA-
SINS, 15, at 62-65 (A. Garretson, R. Hoyton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967); THE LEGAL REGIME
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES (R. Zacklin & L. Caflisch eds. 1981).
282. Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215
(1979).
283. The "property" character of the common heritage concept shows up more clearly in
its French wording, patrimoine commun de 'humanit6.
284. 23 U.N. GAOR First Committee (1589th mtg.), U.N. Doe. A/C.I/PV.1589, at 7
(1968),
285. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 157, art. 137(2).
286. Id., art. 153 and Annex IV, Statute of the Enterprise, art. 1.
287. Graf Vitzthum, supra note 117, at 294-95.
288. For the texts of the national statutes, see 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1003 (1980), 20
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1228 (1981), 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 867 (1982) (U.S.A.); 21 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 832 (1982) (F.R.G.); 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1219 (1981) (U.K.); 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
808 (France); 22 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 102 (Japan). See also Brown, The Impact of Unilateral
Legislation on the Future Legal Regime of Deep-Sea Mining, 20 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS
145 (1982).
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ocean floor, the idea of common heritage of mankind seems to have taken
hold in the framework of international law. Given the concept's particu-
lar features, 289 however, it is but one of several regimes conceivable
under the notion of res publica.
Transposed into today's world constitutive process, the idea of respub-
lica refers to patterns of shared inclusive competence reaching beyond res
communis. The geostationary orbit is a heavily used and, at the same
time, finite resource. This factual context and the basic community pol-
icy of ensuring equitable access call for a regime of shared inclusive con-
trol. Thus, in a most general way, the resource at hand may safely be
called a res publica internationalis.
This shared inclusive competence may be exercised under various con-
figurations of substantive arrangements and institutional structures. Sev-
eral such model regimes have been proposed with respect to the
geostationary orbit. They may be arranged on a scale, with increasing
degrees of inclusive administration, from a market scheme to orbit/spec-
trum taxes and planning, and, finally, to direct inclusive use of the
resource.
1. Market Model
According to this scheme, an "international space condominium"
should be created that would auction user rights to the twin resources of
the geostationary orbit. Revenues from these auctions would be distrib-
uted by that agency "in proportion to nations' shares" in the orbit.
These shares would have to be determined by political negotiations. 290
The condominium could auction limited user rights at recurrent inter-
vals, or it could be dissolved after distribution of the rents from a first-
and last-auction of unlimited user rights.29 1 To achieve static and dy-
namic efficiency for this scheme, there should be a complete allocation
regime, divisible and marketable user rights, long contract periods, and
well-defined liability rules.292 A "complete allocation regime" would in-
clude all resources that substitute for, or complement each other.293 The
model requires, for example, that traditional long-distance communica-
tions via submarine cable, wire or wireless, which are possible substitutes
for satellite communications, also be subject to the market scheme.
In view of current heavy regulation of the spectrum resource by na-
tion-states as well as at the inclusive level, it win be difficult to attain
289. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
290. Wihlborg & Wijkman, supra note 102, at 43.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 29.
293. Id. at 30.
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such a complete allocation regime. Exceptions to marketability include
public goods, such as emergency communications and military serv-
ices. 294 The efficiency of this scheme is therefore doubtful. Flexibility is
sacrificed if the condominium (a word which suggests a more intensive
form of inclusive control) limits its function to a once-and-for-all sale of
user rights. Such a sale would result in virtual conveyance of title to the
resources, contrary to the basic policy of avoiding permanent priorities.
Finally, the principle of equitable access to the geostationary orbit is not
fulfilled by redistribution of wealth through a distribution of rents. As
outlined above, developing countries strove for schemes like transfer of
technology in order to gain actual access to the resource at hand. Their
ultimate aim of self-reliance is furthered best by gaining access to space
stations for indigenous communications, educational, medical, and cul-
tural purposes, as well as for the screening of their resources and agricul-
ture. Sometimes, use of satellites for these purposes cannot be
substituted except at high costs.
Thus, the market model encounters severe problems in meeting basic
community policies.
2. Tax Scheme
The model of levying taxes or use charges on the utilization of the
orbit/spectrum resource is based on the idea that the traditional "first-
come, first-served" approach leads to a "windfall because its users pay
nothing for something that clearly has an economic value." 295
As compared to the market model, the difficulty with this is that there
probably is no objective economic value on the basis of which the tax or
use charge could be computed. If the tax is fixed at an amount at which
costs to the investor exceed benefits, the scheme will lead to under-utili-
zation of the orbit, and thus inefficiency. If the tax is too low, congestion
is inevitable, and secondary allocation regimes will have to be applied.
An auction would resolve this problem.
Furthermore, like the market model, the focus of this scheme is the
raising of funds for global redistribution of wealth. This focus misses the
concern of the world community for more widespread access to the
geostationary orbit.
3. Planning
More oriented toward the goal of widest sharing of the resource are
294. Id. at 39.
295. See E. STEINBERG & J. YAGER, NEw MEANS OF FINANCING INTERNATIONAL
NEEDS 26-30 (1978) (suggesting the taxation of users of scarce resources outside national
jurisdictions).
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model regimes that favor inclusive determinations. One such regime
would be a lottery, organized by an inclusive administrative body. This
random method, however, would be a second choice to a procedure by
which scarce user rights are allocated in an equitable fashion.
At WARC-BS and SAT-83, such a system proved workable. It con-
sists of allotment of orbital slots and frequencies ahead of use, i.e., a pri-
ori planning. This scheme, based on consensus (and so, similar to the
allocation of landing rights at major U.S. airports296) has found a way to
translate equity into orbital positions and frequencies. For the Broad-
casting-Satellite Service, it essentially met the concerns of technologically
less advanced states for later access to the resource.
A sub-model of this planning pattern is the block allotment approach
favored by the U.S. for SAT-83. 297 It would include blocks of frequen-
cies and blocks or clusters of orbital positions. Both would provide more
flexibility for internal decision-making processes, but would not affect the
general balance of equity.
Yet the basic problem with current planning systems is their overall
lack of flexibility. Insufficient arrangements for changing assignments
pursuant to demand and the possibilities of extending assignments
repeatedly might lead to the establishment of de facto permanent
priorities.
Furthermore, pure a priori planning leads to difficulties with the basic
community policies of efficiency and economy of use. As long as some
states are not able to use their assigned frequencies and orbital positions,
these resources might lie fallow. It has been proposed that these unused
places and frequencies might be rented.298 However, this model could
only lead to efficiency if there were a duty to lease on the part of the state
to which the resource was allotted.
4. International Space Agency
The last model expresses the highest degree of inclusive control. It
posits the creation of an international space agency with enterprise func-
tions, along the lines of the International Sea-Bed Authority.299 It would
take over planning and execution of space-related activities, in particular
construction and launching of space vehicles.
Creation of such a body would face more serious opposition than the
Sea-Bed Authority, even if it were to operate alongside national space
296. See Grether, Isaac & Plott, The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among
Competitors, 71 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 166 (1981).
297. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
298. Hart, A Review of WARC-79 and its Implications for the Development of Satellite
Communications Services, 12 LAW. AM. 442, 458 (1980).
299. See supra notes 165, 285-86 and accompanying text.
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agencies, as in the regime of the ocean floor. First, density problems on
the geostationary orbit are so acute that parallel assignments are not pos-
sible. Second, space technology is in the vanguard of innovation. It is
difficult to conceive of the advanced technology countries international-
izing that resource completely. Further, the competition between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which culminated in the race to the moon, is per-
ceived to have produced the most significant advances in exploration and
use of outer space, as well as overall technological progress. Third, the
array of military satellites placed in geostationary orbit is a reminder of
the basic goal of all states-security. During the 1978 special session of
the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, France pro-
posed the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency
(ISMA). Although the annual costs of ISMA to the international com-
munity would be less than one percent of total yearly expenditure on
armaments,300 this suggestion has not yet been taken seriously by the
superpowers. Finally, an International Space Agency would encounter
problems similar to those faced by the Sea-Bed Authority regarding the
composition of its principal organs.
30 1
All four basic model regimes of the geostationary orbit thus exhibit
serious deficiencies when compared to the requirements of the global
community for the public order of the orbit. New ways have to be found.
V. Recommended Regime
It is virtually impossible to fulfill all four basic community policies
outlined above. Tradeoffs will always have to be made among the
demands of equitable access, flexibility, efficiency, and economy. The fol-
lowing system of options, blended with elements of the models described
above, is designed to assure to the fullest extent possible that the essen-
tials of the public order of the geostationary orbit are met. It consists of
six basic elements:
1. World administrative radio conferences of the ITU allot, on a con-
sensus basis, options to use parts of the spectrum and the orbital
arc to individual countries. This process could begin at the 1985
WARC on the Geostationary Orbit. As a matter of preference,
allotments should cover a block of frequencies and orbital posi-
tions rather than individual channels or slots.
2. The same inclusive processes periodically review the basic balance
of equity struck through the initial allotments and adjust them in
300. See SIPRI, supra note 33, at 107-08.
301. See Graf Vitzthum, supra note 117, at 294-95.
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response to changes in technology, demand, and territorial
configurations.
3. Options are exercised by utilizing the respective frequencies and
orbital positions. Spacecraft approaching the end of their activity
or their authorized period of use have to be removed from the
orbit.
4. Control over the use of the resources represented by unexercised
options remains in the hands of the international community.
Acting on its behalf, the IFRB, as custodian of an international
public trust, leases the unused slots and frequencies to the highest
bidder. The duration of the lease is chosen with reference to the
time when the original holder of the option will be able and willing
to use the resource as well as with reference to the techno-eco-
nomic implications of the various space systems, such as the life-
times of the satellites.
5. For the duration of the lease, rights to exercise the option are sus-
pended. After expiration of the lease, these rights revert to the
original holder.
6. Revenues from the auction of unexercised options are used to fur-
ther the transfer of space technology so as to enable all countries
to gain direct access to the geostationary orbit. For this purpose,
the creation of a world space technology center should be
envisioned.
Evaluating this system in light of the four community policies outlined
above reveals the advantages of this approach.
First, this system would promote efficiency of use. Exercised options
and the rental of unused portions of the orbit and spectrum would ideally
lead to maximum use of the resource. Here, maximum use means opti-
mal use. Stationing satellites at safe distances from one another and
transmitting signals at non-interfering frequencies have no negative im-
pact on the environment.
Second, economy of use would be promoted by the market elements of
the scheme, as well as by the restrictions imposed on individual countries
by the framework of allotments. Some basic economic analysis will oc-
cur in evaluating the rented slots and frequencies and possible substi-
tutes. For example, the relative costs and benefits of space stations will
be weighed against alternative transmission by terrestrial or transoceanic
cable, using new fiber-optic technology. A complete external and inter-
nal market scheme for both kinds of resources will probably not be at-
tained, however.
In addition, scarcity of allotted options will promote intensity of use.
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The development of improved station-keeping technology to permit
closer spacing of satellites, the combination of several applications on one
spacecraft, and the use of sophisticated methods to increase the use of the
radio-frequency spectrum will be pursued. The obligation to remove in-
active and drifting satellites from geostationary orbit will also contribute
to a more economical utilization of the resource.
Third, periodic reviews of the options allotted to individual countries
will help to adjust the balance of equity struck by the initial consensus to
new developments of technology, demand, and composition of the world
community. Rearrangements might be necessary in order to
accommodate large space structures of the future. Territorial changes
might require new assessments of the needs and demands of particular
nation-states. Outcomes of these reviews will be implemented by the
duty to remove objects from the assigned orbital location if the right to
use is terminated by the international community. This flexibility on the
inclusive level is accompanied by greater regulatory margins for exclu-
sive decision-makers. They would be entrusted with the division of allot-
ted blocks of frequencies into individual channels as well as the
arrangement of satellites within a continuous position on the orbital arc.
Finally, this system would meet the concerns of technologically less
advanced countries for maintaining a basic option to use the geostation-
ary orbit once they are able and willing. This aim is achieved by linking
rental periods to the estimated time at which these countries will reach
that point. However, it should be taken into account that for technical as
well as economic reasons, satellites are designed for a certain lifetime,
now an average of ten years. This fact should also be considered in deter-
mining the period of particular leases.
The goal of equitable access would not be furthered by distribution of
benefits alone. To promote widespread direct access to the geostationary
orbit, revenues from auctions of unused spaces and frequencies should be
used to set up an inclusive system of information on space activities.
This system would provide information on benefits from uses of outer
space as well as on existing space systems and access thereto. Evalua-
tions of national industrial capabilities, possibilities for the development
of space technology, and present international mechanisms for the trans-
fer of space technology would be made.30 2 At an inclusive level, the auc-
tion revenues would help to assemble critical resources of competence to
establish national or regional space capabilities. At a later stage, these
302. See Leister, Space Technology for Development Dreams and Realities, PROC. 22ND
COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 169, 174 (1980).
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
revenues might also be used to finance inclusive policing of the orbit,
through removal of unauthorized and drifting satellites and space debris.
Such mine-sweeping missions, if technically possible, would probably
have to be executed, at first, by the leading space powers. Liability rules
for leaving space junk on the orbital lane would also have to be formu-
lated and enforced at an inclusive level.
For the effective implementation of the inclusive regime suggested, it is
critical that initial allotments and changes of options be arrived at by
consensus. Space law has been written successfully in this way by UN-
COPUOS, and through the ITU's worldwide radio conferences.
The institutional structure for the recommended regime could be pro-
vided by a novel, specialized body, an International Space Agency. It
could focus on the particular problems of outer space by collecting all
available information and furnishing advice on space science and tech-
nology. It would also provide a basic framework for other resource re-
gimes in outer space. For example, if the global community ultimately
were to decide to begin space mining 30 3 under an inclusive regime, as
foreshadowed in the 1979 Moon Treaty, such a decisionmaking body
would already be in place.
The times, however, do not favor grand designs. Thus, it seems more
conducive to the outlined regime for its aims to be realized in the frame-
work of a body that has already established a tradition of quiet, but ex-
traordinarily efficient, accomplishment of its tasks: the ITU. Allotments
of options to use the orbit/spectrum resource would best be effected at its
world administrative radio conferences. Authoritative decisions of these
conferences would be based on consensus, as they are now. Auctions of
orbital slots and frequencies as well as policing functions could be ef-
fected by the IFRB. These custodians of an international public trust
have already moved from a ministerial function to policy formulation
and an advisory role on the use of the orbit/spectrum resource.304 To
underscore this change of role, its designation might be changed to "In-
ternational Orbit and Frequency Board (IOFB)." Under the auspices of
the ITU, a space technology center should be established in close cooper-
ation with the United Nations' International Space Information Ser-
vice. 30 5 It would perform the functions outlined above relating to
development of national and regional space capabilities.
303. For a discussion of the technical possibilities of space mining, see Gaffey & McCord,
Mining Outer Space, 79 TECH. REv. June 1977, 51; O'Leary, Mining the Apollo and Amor
Asteroids, 197 SCIENcE 363 (1977).
304. See supra note 226.
305. See supra note 250.
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Like any model, this proposed system is based on a set of assumptions
about the state of technology, the structure and outcome of world consti-
tutive processes, and present expectations about future developments.
Radical changes in technology could solve or alter some of the con-
straints on which the need for a public order of the geostationary orbit is
based. A breakdown in elite restraints on the peaceful use of outer space,
or some fundamental shift in the primacy of the nation-state in the struc-
ture of international relations, could undermine other premises of the
regime.306 For the present and the foreseeable future, however, the sys-
tem proposed would satisfy as far as possible the aspirations of all partici-
pants in the global arena.
Conclusion
The era of scarcity has reached outer space. With regard to the twin
resource of the geostationary orbit, limits to growth are set by dangers of
space object collision and shortage of frequencies. Access to this non-
depleting but finite resource has to be provided on an equitable basis.
Other basic community policies with regard to orbital positions and
space communication frequencies include flexibility, efficiency, and econ-
omy of use.
These goals would be best served by allotting to individual states op-
tions to use the resource, through worldwide consensus. Inclusive leas-
ing to the highest bidder of unused orbital positions and frequencies
would lead to optimum use of both orbit and spectrum. It would also
ensure revenues for a world space technology center designed to enhance
capabilities of direct access to outer space by all countries. Space powers
would benefit from inclusive guarantees for their investments in the area,
as well as from non-discriminatory leasing arrangements and the adapta-
bility of the options system to changes in demand and technology. Tech-
nological late-comers would be provided access de jure, and ultimately,
de facto.
Technology and human ingenuity have made the band of space around
the planet a natural resource of advanced global civilization. They have
not devised an equally advanced system of public order for its regulation.
The model developed here takes account of the imperfect character of
international politics and law in the absence of effective centralized insti-
tutions by seeking to harness the enlightened self-interest of state elites.
306. See Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 31-33 (1973).
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It rejects a sterile conception of zero-sum. Instead, congruence of inter-
est and the experience of mutual benefits would be the foundation for the
public order of a resource now universally recognized as indispensable.
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